Explaining Divergent Revolutionary Coalitions

Regime Strategies and the Structuring of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

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The revolutions that swept through the Arab world in 2010–11 were massive political upheavals in which millions of citizens took to the streets against their respective regimes. In a matter of weeks, two longstanding authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt fell, while leaders of other Arab states braced for the worst. These explosions took the world by surprise, unleashing a search for the causal factors underlying this cascade of contention.

No shortage of candidate explanations exists. Some ascribe these revolts to the rapid growth of social media in the region, which channeled grievances into collective action.[1] Others point to the emergence of a civil society that provided new norms and organizational impetus to rebel.[2] Still others explain them by reference to a "youth bulge" and to widespread youth unemployment, which fueled the dissatisfaction behind the uprisings.[3] Liberal economists contend that the combination of growing inequality, a receding state, and rising levels of education produced a combination of grievances and aspirations sufficient to propel revolutionary challenges.[4] Marxists, by contrast, point to the location of Arab states in the world capitalist system as critical to the production of revolt.[5]

Each of these arguments holds some explanatory power. But they also flatten some important variation across cases, both in whether revolt occurred at all and in the composition of social actors mobilizing to challenge these regimes. A number of scholars have turned to explaining variation across the Arab revolutions by the scope of contention, the degree of violence, and the outcomes they precipitated. Bellin argues that these factors can largely be accounted for by differences in civil-military relations and societal grievances, while Brownlee et al. identify the presence of oil and hereditary monarchs as key variables driving outcomes.[6] As Anderson has noted, the real causal story of the Arab revolutions ultimately may not boil down to "how the globalization of the norms of civic engagement shaped the protesters' aspirations," or "how activists used technology to share ideas and tactics," but rather "how and why these ambitions and techniques resonated in their

various local contexts."[7] Though the uprisings were part of an interrelated wave of rebellions, the factors underpinning revolt may actually have differed substantially in each case.

This article examines patterns of individual participation in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions.[8] We do not seek to explain the outcomes of these revolutions or their disparate post-revolutionary trajectories. Rather, we address two critical aspects of how revolutionary processes unfolded: which sectors of society mobilized against their incumbent regimes, and why; and the ways in which those who mobilized in rebellion were organized, coordinated, and connected to one another. Based on survey data, we find that in both uprisings economic grievances (and, to a lesser extent, grievances over corruption) dominated the agendas of most participants, while civil and political freedoms ranked lower. But we also find important differences in the constituencies that mobilized in these two revolutions. Whereas participants in the Egyptian Revolution were disproportionately middle-aged, middle class, and professional, participants in the Tunisian Revolution were younger and significantly more diverse in social composition, with workers, students, and the unemployed also mobilizing in significant numbers. In this respect, the Tunisian Revolution represented more of a cross-class coalition than the Egyptian Revolution. We also find that civil society associations played a much larger role in organizing participation in the Egyptian Revolution than in the Tunisian Revolution, which relied to a greater degree on internet coordination. While the prevailing explanations referenced above may account for particular aspects of these patterns, none consistently explains them across the two cases. In fact, the variation we observe runs counter to many of the narratives that have widely circulated about these revolutions.

To explain these differences, we develop a historical argument that centers on disparate regime strategies in response to similar international and domestic structural pressures for state contraction and political reform in the years immediately prior to these uprisings. These responses created different sites of heightened grievance and configurations of opposition mobilizing structures, which Tarrow defines as the "connective structures" that motivate and sustain collective action, such as formal organizations or informal social ties.[9] Specifically, Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare protections that benefited the middle class and co-opting opposition by allowing some space for civil society development created conditions conducive to an urban middle-class revolt consisting disproportionately of the middle-aged, fueled by economic grievances, and led by civil society associations. By contrast, Ben Ali's corporatist and constrictive approach undermined a once vibrant civil society, while his economic policies exacerbated regional disparities and fostered a pool of dissatisfied youth, creating the basis for a disproportionately young cross-class alliance that initiated in the provinces, slowly spread to the capital, and was largely coordinated outside civil society associations. We argue, in short, that disparate regime responses to similar pressures for state contraction and political reform played a central role in shaping who would participate in these revolutions once they broke out and how participants were connected to one another. Regime responses to structural pressures determined the locus of the heightened grievances underlying these revolts and left behind different organizational possibilities through which these segments of society could mobilize.

By focusing on the consequences of differential regime actions in response to similar pressures for change, the approach taken here offers a state-centric account for observed individual-level variation in patterns of revolutionary mobilization. Not all revolutions are driven, as in Tunisia and Egypt, primarily by grievances over economic concerns and corruption, and revolutions come in wide variety.[10] Yet no revolution arises solely as a result of changes in the opportunities offered by shifting state institutions. Walder notes that the literatures on revolutions and social movements have, in recent years, come to focus narrowly on the process of mobilization and the institutional configurations enabling it, rather than on how revolutions and social movements connect to deeper structural factors that might underpin revolutionary action.[11] By focusing on differential regime responses to similar pressures and the effect of those responses on patterns of societal grievance as well as the mobilizing structures underlying revolutionary challenges, we provide an account that connects large-scale structural change with individual behavior—but primarily through the mediation of state policy choices.

The 2011 Arab Barometer Survey and Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions

We begin with an analysis of who participated in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions based on unusual survey data available from the second round of the Arab Barometer study—a set of nationally representative surveys about political life, governance, and political, social, and cultural values administered in eleven Arab countries. The survey was fielded in Egypt in June 2011 and in Tunisia in October 2011—shortly after the revolutionary tides that swept both countries. Though the Arab Barometer was not originally designed to study the Arab revolutions, an additional battery of questions that we helped to design was added to the 2011 round of the survey to identify individual participation in and attitudes towards these revolutions. In Egypt, 1,220 people were surveyed, while in Tunisia the sample size was 1,196.[12]

Respondents were asked: "Did you participate in the protests against former president Hosni Mubarak/Ben Ali between January 25 and February 11, 2011/ December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011?" Respondents were constrained to answering "yes" or "no," making the response variable binary. In Egypt, 8 percent of the sample (n=98) answered the question positively, compared to 16 percent of those surveyed in Tunisia (n=192). There are obvious issues involved in any retrospective survey of revolutionary participation. Attitudes and beliefs are themselves affected by the experience of revolution, and bandwagoning and preference falsification are inherent parts of revolutionary processes. But revolutions are unpredictable occurrences involving large-scale mobilization that unfolds across time, so the question of who participates in a revolutionary episode is not answerable until after a revolutionary episode has ended. There are few alternatives to retrospective surveys if one seeks to understand systematically who participated in a revolution. These surveys represent the best information available about participation in these revolutions, and we have no reason to believe that whatever distortions might exist

in the survey results due to preference falsification were greater in one society than the other. Moreover, the levels of participation reported in the 2011 Arab Barometer survey approximate those found in other retrospective surveys of these revolutions.[13]

Our strategy in analyzing these data was to examine how the two sets of participants were similar or different across the revolutions, and how participants compared with the larger populations from which they were drawn. An examination of these patterns points to a series of differences between participants in these two revolutions that begs further explanation and constitutes the puzzle that this article addresses.

First, the Arab Barometer survey suggests that economic grievances trumped other motivations among the majority of those who participated in both revolutions. Despite the ways in which the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions were widely interpreted in the media at the time, participants in both revolutions predominantly believed that economic issues (and to a lesser extent, corruption) were the main motivations for citizen participation in these revolts rather than civil and political liberties. The Arab Barometer asked respondents to identify the most important and second most important reasons why citizens participated in their society's respective revolutions.[14] As Table 1 makes clear, economic issues predominated among the answers of those who participated in these revolutions. Demands for improving the economic situation were identified as either a primary or secondary reason for revolutionary participation by 77 percent of the Tunisian revolutionaries and 67 percent of the Egyptian revolutionaries—by far the most frequently cited motivation of those cited. In both revolutions, combating corruption was the second most frequently cited reason for rebellion among revolution participants—noted as a primary or secondary reason for rebellion by 56 percent of

Table 1 Reasons for Participation in Protests

	Egypt			Tunisia		
	Most important reason	Second most important reason	Either	Most important reason	Second most important reason	Either
Demands for improving the economic situation	38%	30%	67%	58%	19%	77%
Demands for civil and political freedom	18%	11%	29%	21%	29%	50%
Demands for authority not to be passed down to Gamal Mubarak	22%	16%	37%	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
Combating corruption	18%	38%	56%	15%	45%	60%
Replacing the incumbent regime with an Islamic regime	2%	4%	6%	6%	5%	11%
Sample size	n=96	n=97		n=191	n=191	

Egyptian revolutionaries and 60 percent of Tunisian revolutionaries (in Egypt another 36 percent of revolutionaries identified the succession of Mubarak's son Gamal as a primary or secondary reason for participation). In both revolutions, however, civil and political freedoms ranked lower among the motivations for rebellion indicated by the revolutionaries themselves (cited by only 29 percent of Egyptian participants and 50 percent of Tunisian participants). In short, participants in both revolutions understood the reasons why citizens rebelled as being primarily economic, with issues of corruption also salient, and demands for civil and political freedoms ranking relatively low.

Second, although the dominant motivations for revolution appear to have been economic, both sets of revolutionaries were disproportionately recruited from the middle class. For one thing, they were significantly more educated than non-participants.[15] Moreover, in both countries middle class occupations were disproportionately represented among revolution participants. The Arab Barometer contains detailed occupation information, with thirteen different occupational categories reported, including groups outside the labor force. Four of the occupational categories contain segments of the urban middle class: professional; employer or director of an institution; government employee; and private sector employee.[16] Taken as a whole, these four categories were overrepresented among revolution participants in both states—particularly in Egypt, where they constituted 55 percent of revolution participants but only 25 percent of the overall population. Professionals stand out as an especially active group in the Egyptian Revolution, constituting 17 percent of participants but only 5 percent of the Egyptian population.[17] Similarly, in Tunisia middle class occupational categories comprised 30 percent of revolution participants (as compared with 19 percent of the Tunisian sample as a whole).

Third, despite the fact that the middle class was disproportionately represented among revolutionaries in both societies, the class composition of the two sets of participants differed significantly. A majority (55 percent) of those participating in the Egyptian Revolution came from middle class occupations. But only 9 percent were workers, 3 percent were students, and 5 percent were unemployed—lower than the presence of these categories within the Egyptian population. By contrast, the Tunisian Revolution was significantly more diverse in terms of the class backgrounds of participants. In Tunisia, not only was the middle class over-represented among revolutionaries, but so also were workers (17 percent of participants), students (19 percent), and the unemployed (22 percent). Unlike in Egypt, the majority of participants in the Tunisian Revolution were not from the occupationally-defined middle class, and the coalition underpinning the Tunisian Revolution more closely approximated a cross-class alliance.

We performed a multiple regression of participation on occupational status, controlling for age and gender (Table 3). In the Egyptian sample, there was a statistically significant difference between participation by the middle class in the revolution's protests and participation by the rest of the population. Indeed, the odds of middle-class participation in the Egyptian Revolution were more than three times the odds of participation by other occupational groupings. By contrast, the propensity of workers, students, and the unemployed to participate was not statistically different from the rest of the population. In the

Table 2 Revolutionary Participation by Category

	Egypt		Tunisia	
	% total population	% revolutionaries	% total population	% revolutionaries
AVERAGE	8.1		16.0	
EDUCATION				
Elementary or less	38.0	15.5	46.4	20.3
Secondary/technical	42.9	38.1	36.4	51.6
Some BA or above	19.1	46.4	17.2	28.1
INCOME QUINTILES				
0-20 (poorest)		13.3		9.9
20-40		7.2		17.3
40-60		33.7		20.4
60-80		16.9		24.1
80-100 (richest)		28.9		28.4
OCCUPATION				
Employer/director of institution	2.1	5.1	1.8	5.3
Professional	5.2	17.3	3.4	4.7
Government employee	12.5	21.4	6.5	12.1
Private sector employee	5.4	11.2	7.0	7.9
Manual laborer	10.4	9.2	14.0	16.8
Housewife	38.4	12.2	25.4	3.7
Student	3.2	3.1	8.6	18.9
Unemployed	5.3	5.1	17.7	21.6
FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES PARTICIPATED IN REVOLUTION	28.1	84.7	40.0	86.5
MEMBER OF CIVIL SOCIETY ASSOCIATION	14.7	42.9	6.0	18.8
REGULAR INTERNET USER (AT LEAST ONCE A WEEK)	16.1	44.9	28.5	56.3
MAIN INFORMATION SOURCE DURING REVOLUTION				
Internet/Facebook/Email	2.3	14.3	13.7	35.8
TV	94.8	80.6	82.2	61.1
AGE CATEGORY				
18-24	13.4	13.3	19.1	35.4
25-34	29.3	30.6	23.7	25.0
35-44	21.8	28.6	20.2	15.6
45-54	18.2	18.4	17.7	15.1
55-64	12.3	7.1	10.8	6.3
65 or older	5.0	2.0	8.5	2.6

Tunisian sample, the odds of middle-class participation were only twice as great as the odds of participation by other occupational groupings. But not only was the middle class more likely to participate than the rest of the population, so also were workers, the unemployed, and students (the coefficient for workers was only marginally significant). In short, a key puzzle that needs to be explained is why the class composition of participants in these two revolutions differed so significantly, with Egypt representing a relatively narrow middle class revolt, and Tunisia constituting a broader cross-class coalition.

Table 3 Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Occupation

3a. EGYPT						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Middle class occupation	3.287	4.92****	3.234	3.97****	3.235	3.97****
Worker			0.827	−0.42	0.826	−0.42
Student			0.915	−0.12	0.907	−0.13
Unemployed			1.280	0.47		
Educated unemployed					1.070	0.12
Uneducated unemployed					2.482	0.87
Age	0.981	−2.08**	0.981	−1.97**	0.981	−2.01**
Gender (F=0, M=1)	2.750	3.77****	2.795	3.37****	2.787	3.35****
Constant	0.060	−7.30****	0.059	−6.90****	0.061	−6.84****
n	1219		1219		1219	
Pseudo R-square	.0935		.0945		.0957	
Log likelihood	−310.95		−310.61		−310.22	
Log likelihood ratio chi-square	58.65****		60.10****		60.43****	

3b. TUNISIA						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Middle class occupation	1.940	3.33****	3.210	4.21****	3.247	4.23****
Worker			1.702	1.76*	1.731	1.81*
Student			3.352	3.52****	3.557	3.60****
Unemployed			1.909	2.14**		
Educated unemployed					2.513	2.68***
Uneducated unemployed					1.233	0.51
Age	0.953	−6.81****	0.966	−4.32****	0.969	−3.83****
Gender (F=0, M=1)	5.247	8.54****	4.509	7.37****	4.556	7.47****
Constant	0.329	−4.13****	0.135	−4.92****	0.119	−5.03****
n	1196		1196		1196	
Pseudo R-square	.1506		.1626		.1657	
Log likelihood	−448.59		−442.23		−440.60	
Log likelihood ratio chi-square	125.19****		126.28****		130.48****	

**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Fourth, the Arab Barometer surveys show that different age groups predominated in the two revolutions. Table 2 shows that the younger age group (18–24) was disproportionately represented among Tunisian revolutionaries (35 percent of revolutionaries, as opposed to 19 percent of the sample population). By contrast, a group nearing middle age (aged 35–44) was the most overrepresented of any age range among Egyptian protesters (29 percent of revolutionaries, as opposed to 22 percent of the sample population). A multiple regression of participation on age, reported in Model 1 of Table 4,

Table 4 Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Age[a]

4a. EGYPT				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Age 18-24	0.824	−0.53	0.947	−0.14
Age 25-34	0.784	−0.85	0.784	−0.85
Age 45-54	0.675	−1.20	0.675	−1.20
Age 55-64	0.364	−2.30**	0.364	−2.30**
Age 65 and over	0.255	−1.82*	0.254	−1.82*
Gender (F=0, M=1)	3.767	5.30****	3.843	5.25****
Student			0.591	−0.73
Constant	0.051	−9.99****	0.050	−9.89****
n	1219		1219	
Pseudo R-square	.0599		.0610	
Log likelihood	−322.49		−322.09	
Log likelihood ratio chi-square	41.35****		41.38****	

4b. TUNISIA				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Odds ratio	z-score	Odds ratio	z-score
Age 18-24	3.337	4.63****	2.747	3.42****
Age 25-34	1.492	1.53	1.475	1.48
Age 45-54	1.092	0.30	1.096	0.31
Age 55-64	0.574	−1.53	0.576	−1.52
Age 65 and over	0.333	−2.10**	0.334	−2.09**
Gender (F=0, M=1)	5.503	8.77****	5.424	8.71****
Student			1.554	1.52
Constant	0.048	−11.59****	0.048	−11.57****
n	1196		1196	
Pseudo R-square	.1396		.1418	
Log likelihood	−454.42		−453.25	
Log likelihood ratio chi-square	116.85****		119.04****	

[a]The omitted age category (and basis for comparison) is the 35–44 age group.
**** p<0.001, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

underscores this point; no age group is statistically different from the 35–44 year old group in Egypt except those over 55, who were less likely to participate in both countries. In contrast to the pattern for Egypt, however, the coefficient for the youngest Tunisian age group is both substantively and statistically significant. These patterns hold even when one controls for whether an individual was a student, as Model 2 shows. In short, these revolutions represented different age segments of their respective societies.

Finally, the sources of information used by revolutionaries to coordinate collective action and the mobilizing structures underpinning participation differed across the two revolutions. As the literature on revolution suggests,[18] in both revolutions participants overwhelmingly enjoyed strong personal ties to other participants. Eighty-five percent of participants in the Egyptian Revolution reported that they had friends or acquaintances who also participated in the revolution, as opposed to only 23 percent of non-participants; the corresponding figures for Tunisia are 86 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Moreover, in both revolutions members of civil society associations were overrepresented among revolution participants relative to their share within their respective populations.

However, civil society association members comprised a strikingly larger share of Egyptian revolutionaries (43 percent) than Tunisian revolutionaries (19 percent) (chi-square=19.705, significant at the .001 level). In both Egypt and Tunisia, civil society associations drew members from various segments of society, including professional and trade unions, charitable societies, and cultural or youth associations. Union members, primarily skilled, white-collar workers, formed a significant part of civil society participation in the Egyptian Revolution, with members comprising 23 percent of Egyptian revolutionaries (as compared to only 10 percent of the Egyptian population). In Tunisia union members formed a smaller part of the sample (3 percent), but again contributed protesters at a rate disproportionate to their share of the sample (10 percent of all protesters). Though we have no direct evidence on the religious character of civil society associations, it is reasonable to assume that many were religious in orientation; Islamic charitable societies and religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia exemplify this tendency.[19] Nevertheless, representation of members of civil society associations in the Egyptian Revolution was over twice that of the Tunisian Revolution and comprised close to half of Egyptian revolutionaries.

At the same time, the internet played a more important role in coordinating revolutionary participation in Tunisia than in Egypt. 45 percent of Egyptian Revolution participants and 56 percent of Tunisian Revolution participants reported using the internet at least once a week (as opposed to 14 percent of Egyptian and 23 percent of Tunisian non-participants). But only 14 percent of Egyptian Revolution participants reported that they actually used the internet as their main source of information during the revolution, as opposed to 36 percent of Tunisian Revolution participants (chi-square=14.680, significant at the .001 level). By contrast, 81 percent of Egyptian Revolution participants reported using television as their main source of information during the revolution, compared to only 61 percent of Tunisian Revolution participants (chi-square=11.313, significant at the .001 level). The internet played an important role in coordinating

mobilization among the initial activists during the early phases of the Egyptian Revolution. But as revolutionary events unfolded and larger numbers of citizens became involved, television became the most important source of information for the vast majority of participants. A key puzzle requiring explanation, therefore, is why Egyptian revolutionaries were more than twice as likely to have been connected through membership in civil society associations as Tunisian revolutionaries, while Tunisian revolutionaries were more than 2.5 times more likely than Egyptian revolutionaries to coordinate through the internet.

To sum up, analysis of the 2011 Arab Barometer survey identifies several patterns of individual participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that require explanation. Economic concerns (and to a lesser extent, concerns over corruption) predominated among the motivations cited by participants in both revolutions. But participants in both revolutions were disproportionately middle class. However, the degree to which the middle class was preponderant varied across the two revolutions, with the Tunisian Revolution representing more of a cross-class coalition, while the Egyptian Revolution was more narrowly middle class in composition. Moreover, participants in the Tunisian Revolution were considerably younger than the disproportionately middle-aged participants in the Egyptian Revolution. Finally, civil society association members had a greater presence in the Egyptian Revolution than the Tunisian Revolution, while Tunisian revolutionaries were significantly more likely to rely on the internet as a coordinating device than Egyptian revolutionaries.

Incumbent Regime Strategies and Revolutionary Coalitions

How do we explain these different class and generational configurations of participation across the two revolutions and the different mobilizing structures involved? We argue that these disparate patterns make a great deal of sense when placed in the context of differential regime responses to similar pressures for state contraction and political reform in the years leading up to the revolutions. Figure 1 summarizes our argument. We contend that different incumbent regime strategies of coping with pressures for state contraction and political reform evoked different patterns of heightened grievance and configurations of opposition mobilizing structures in Tunisia and Egypt. Specifically, Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare protections that benefited the middle class and allowing the development of a nascent civil society created conditions conducive to a predominantly urban middle-class revolt fueled by economic grievances and involving, to a greater degree, coordination through civil society association, while Ben Ali's corporatist and constrictive approach to ruling coupled with neo-liberal economic policies undermined a once vibrant civil society and exacerbated regional and generational economic disparities, creating the basis for a cross-class alliance initiated in the provinces and coalescing largely without the mediation of civil society associations. Patterns of individual participation in each revolution reflected the disparate ways in which the regimes responded to similar structural forces in the years leading up to revolt.

Figure 1 Regime Strategies and Divergent Patterns of Participation in the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions



Common Pressures for State Contraction and Political Reform The late 1980s through the late 2000s represented difficult years for autocratic regimes worldwide—particularly for autocratic regimes with bloated state sectors due to their socialist pasts. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global order transformed from a bipolar one to a unipolar one dominated by American priorities of global capitalism, democratization, and human rights. These changes gave rise to new international and domestic pressures within autocratic regimes to engage in state contraction and political reform. Under conditions of the Washington Consensus, states were forced to engage in considerable downsizing and to rein in the costs of state benefits and services to attract financial aid and investment. In the Middle East and North Africa, high rates of population growth and a legacy of heavy domestic subsidization of food and energy increased pressures on state budgets. Skyrocketing world prices for food and energy in the 2000s, as a result of rising global demand, further complicated these tasks.

At the same time, the growth of the middle class (or, at a minimum, growing aspirations to middle class life proceeding from urbanization and education) and the rise of movements pushing for greater political contestation (whether of a liberal or Islamist bent) produced new domestic challenges. Moreover, American and European democracy promotion and the consolidation of an international human rights regime encouraged opposition activism and constituted external donor audiences that incumbent regimes needed to placate. All of this generated significant internal and external pressures for state contraction and political reform within longstanding autocratic states in the Middle East.

Divergent Strategies toward Civil Society The Egyptian and Tunisian regimes responded differently to these pressures. In the 2000s, the Mubarak regime allowed a more independent press and political associational life to take root in response to rising domestic and international pressures. Islamist candidates were permitted to run in the 2005 election, with over fourteen new reform movements founded in the lead-up to the election. While this period also saw widespread electoral fraud and the arrest of prominent regime opponents, the regime's toleration of electoral competition and some degree of civic life were indicative of a strategy geared towards co-opting and marginalizing opposition rather than repressing it outright.[20] Challenges to the Mubarak government from civil society continued after the 2005 election, with increasingly frequent labor strikes and protests for the first time by rank-and-file bureaucrats.[21] This latter group is notable because its members had formed the core of the Egyptian state's supporters since the 1952 revolution.[22] Though demonstrations tended to be small and were often brutally repressed, the fact that challengers kept coming out and were at times tolerated speaks to the growing degree of civil society activity in the final years of the Mubarak regime. Indeed, the Arab Barometer survey found that 15 percent of Egyptians were involved in civil society associations by 2011.[23]

In contrast to the small but palpable institutional opening in Egypt, the Ben Ali regime chose instead to curb civil society activity through harassment, repression, and co-optation, bringing all kinds of interest intermediation under tighter state control. Only 6 percent of Tunisians reported involvement in civil society associations in the 2011 Arab Barometer survey. After Ennahda members received a significant portion of votes in the 1989 elections amid fears that Algeria's Islamist revolt might spill over into Tunisia, the party was accused of plotting a coup and subjected to widespread repression. This opened the door for Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic Rally party to dominate Tunisian politics more completely. Much of Ennahda's leadership went into exile abroad. The regime's campaign of repression against civil society was effective enough that large-scale protest by labor or professional unions was practically unheard of in the last decade of Ben Ali's rule. In its place came diffuse acts of resistance, including suicides among lower class youth and hunger strikes among prominent jurists and leaders of political parties.[24] The General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the national trade union, remained highly subordinate to the state.[25] During the Tunisian Revolution, union activists and prominent lawyers proved important actors in spreading protests beyond Sidi Bouzid and in bringing them to Tunis. Yet they initially did so independently of their unions. It was only after the extent of protest and discontent became clear that the formal union organizations threw their support behind the protests.[26]

Whereas in Egypt the Mubarak regime allowed an opening for civil society activism, independent civil society association was rendered practically impossible by Ben Ali's policies. On the eve of these revolutions, Powel and Sadiki drew a stark contrast between Tunisia and Egypt: "There is draconianism in Egypt and authoritarianism is well-entrenched. But Egyptian society has a vibrant press, and political parties, including the Islamists, have a margin of existence that remains absent in Tunisia, a country that

is qualified [to have a more developed civil society] on the basis of homogeneity, high levels of literacy, association with the EU where nearly 7 percent of the total Tunisian population work and live, and the country's constitutional heritage."[27] Only about ten truly independent civil society groups existed in Tunisia on the eve of the Tunisian Revolution; these were routinely harassed by security agencies, denied legal recognition, and had their funds frozen. To place this in context, there had been over 1,807 registered civil society associations in Tunisia in 1987. The official count of civil society associations actually grew to 8,386 in 2003, but the vast majority of these groups were directly attached to the state, either for staging festivals and cultural events or as vehicles for the distribution of resources gathered by the National Solidarity Fund (FSN), the centerpiece of the Tunisian government's corporatist welfare strategy.[28]

Begun in 1993 and significantly expanded in the 2000s, the FSN was a broad initiative undertaken by the Ben Ali regime involving poverty alleviation programs for large urban areas, housing initiatives, and funding for state-sponsored civil associations. The programs were targeted at "eliminating zones of shadow," a euphemism for areas of unplanned urban development where many of Tunisia's poor live. Aimed at securing the compliance of both the urban poor they served and the broader population that was encouraged to make quasi-mandatory contributions, these programs received "donations" from two million Tunisians (out of a population of ten million) in 2003.[29] A stridently corporatist social bargain like the one crafted in Tunisia can be a double-edged sword. Centralized structures and suppression of independent associational life limited the growth of oppositional networks. But they also marginalized excluded populations, as those who were left out of the corporatist scheme lacked access to both the stagnant, but intact, benefits of the old bargain and the new distributional networks created by crony liberalization.

Structural Adjustment and Spatial/Generational Redistribution in Tunisia Ben Ali's corporatist scheme imposed from above, coupled with far-reaching structural adjustment policies, exacerbated two significant inequalities in Tunisian society: one age-based, as job creation did not keep pace with population growth, and one spatial, between the capital and the regional periphery. In 1986, Tunisia's post-independence experiments with socialism had reached a crisis point, and the government turned to the IMF and World Bank for loans conditional on structural adjustment. In the 2000s, structural reforms were deepened, with the aim of creating a fully liberalized economy integrated into global markets. Though the effort was thoroughly ensconced in cronyism and corruption, Tunisia experienced decent rates of economic growth during this period, becoming a poster child for international financial institutions. In the 1990s, many of the gains from this growth accrued to small and medium size businesses; at the beginning of his tenure, Ben Ali negotiated trade agreements with European states and pressured labor organizations in ways congenial to business interests. By contrast, the wave of privatization that followed in the 2000s redistributed property to a small group of families (referred to by analysts and Tunisians alike as "clans") around the President and his wife, at the cost of small and medium sized businesses.[30]

Though the Tunisian public sector did not contract to the extent that Egypt's did during the 2000s,[31] expansion of public employment trailed the growth of the labor force. This fact figures prominently among the reasons that 44 percent of the university educated 18–29 year old population (and 30 percent of the total youth population) were unemployed in Tunisia.[32] Our statistical analysis suggests that one particular segment of this population—those unemployed with a secondary or higher education—participated in the Tunisian Revolution at disproportionately high rates (see Table 3, model 3). The plight of the educated unemployed, however, must be placed into context: state contraction also adversely affected the working class and the poor, and the unemployed with university degrees made up only 4 percent of our sample, constituting only 29 percent of total unemployed youth in the population at large.[33]

As a result of declining government subsidies, food prices spiked sharply, and remaining price supports on essential foodstuffs were inadequate to compensate, particularly for the poorer segments of the population whose diets were highly dependent on cereals. A large portion of the population that hovered just above the poverty line was especially vulnerable.[34] The Tunisian approach to price subsidies stands in sharp contrast to Egyptian food policy, in which a ration card program covering 80 percent of the population and an absolute price ceiling on bread—not benchmarked to inflation—were maintained throughout this period. This ensured that the poorest segments of the Egyptian population could depend on bread from the state, notwithstanding the reduction in dietary diversity brought on by the skyrocketing prices of non-subsidized foodstuffs.[35]

Regional disparities greatly exacerbated these patterns of deprivation in Tunisia. Investment and business policy greatly favored the capital Tunis and a few coastal cities (in particular, the Sousse and Monastir regions, from which the former president hailed) at the cost of the interior and other coastal cities. One excluded city, Sfax, saw local businessmen support union mobilization against the regime and was the site of the largest demonstrations of the Tunisian uprising.[36] The fate of wage earners also varied regionally. On the eve of the revolution, 140 thousand individuals were added to the Tunisian labor market annually, but jobs were created at a rate of 80 to 85 thousand per year.[37] Most of this job creation occurred in the Greater Tunis area, exacerbating unemployment and poverty in those regions of the country already struggling. Differential patterns of poverty alleviation between 2000 and 2010 reinforced the regional pattern of Tunisian underdevelopment. On the eve of the revolution, the Center-West region, where revolutionary protests began, had official poverty rates three times the national average.[38] While some of the burdens of liberalization fell on sectors of the middle class, many of its greatest effects were felt by the young and those in peripheral regions. In short, unbridled price liberalization, lagging state employment, and a poverty reduction policy sharply differentiated by region left behind heightened economic grievances that were distinctly regional and generational in character, eventually providing the fuel for a cross-class oppositional coalition spearheaded by the young.

State Contraction and the Egyptian Middle Class The contrast between Tunisia's policies (and the regionally and generationally differentiated pattern of economic

deprivation that they produced) and the disintegrating Egyptian welfare state of the 2000s (whose shifting burdens fell increasingly on the established middle class) is stark. The high water mark of Egyptian repression and solidarism was the Egypt of Nasser's and Sadat's Arab Socialist Union, the official single party that was disbanded in the late 1970s. The Egyptian urban middle class is to a large extent a legacy of the Nasser-led nationalization of most industry in the late 1950s and the state-led development that followed it. Comfortable, remunerative white collar jobs were to be found in civil service or state-owned industry, and the state provided public services like schools and hospital care generally deemed adequate by this class.[39] Fiscal crises of the 1980s and 1990s led the Egyptian state to reduce the real wages of civil servants, borrow against pension and insurance funds held in government-run banks, and introduce new taxes that fell disproportionately on salaried workers and wage earners because of selective enforcement.[40] Though peasants and the urban poor also suffered during this period, the group experiencing the greatest change in life chances in the years leading up to the revolution was the one that the Egyptian state had historically taken the greatest pains to protect: the urban salariat.[41]

In the late Mubarak years the public sector continued to constitute a central part of overall Egyptian employment, but its importance had diminished. Though the public sector constituted 27 percent of the overall Egyptian workforce in 2010, this figure represented a 10 percent reduction in public employment as a fraction of total employment compared to 2000.[42] The overall public wage bill gives further indication of the sharp devaluation of public sector jobs under Mubarak. In the early 2000s, 29 percent of current government expenditure went towards public sector salaries, as opposed to 63 percent in Tunisia.[43] This difference helps explain the high rate of revolutionary participation among Egyptian government employees found in the 2011 Arab Barometer sample: 21 percent of Egyptian revolutionaries, as opposed to 13 percent of the Egyptian sample as a whole. As a result of significant cutbacks in the state sector under Mubarak, most civil servants in Egypt were subject to insufficient selective incentives binding them to the regime.

The progressive dismantling of the Egyptian welfare state and the related one-party system of interest intermediation was supercharged by a "government of businessmen," appointed in 2004 and led by Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, that eviscerated an already shrinking social protection scheme.[44] The new government privatized 5.34 billion USD of state industries in fiscal year 2006–7 alone—far more than the 3.12 billion USD of state industry privatized in the ten years preceding the Nazif government.[45] Gamal Mubarak, the London investment banker turned NDP operative and son of the President, epitomized this evolution of the ruling elite "from the managers of society's economic assets to the owners of these assets."[46]

A broad swath of Egyptian society faced steeply declining economic prospects, and the frustrations of the Egyptian middle class in particular were directed towards economic issues. Privatization of formerly state-controlled industries accompanied a vast drop-off in the quality of publicly provided services. Only those close to the "government of businessmen" could offset this decline by purchasing access to private schools

and health services.[47] Liberalization thus bifurcated the white-collar class of the Arab Socialist era, leaving the vast majority of its members scrambling for services that their predecessors took for granted and that they saw as their entitlement. The overall level of privatization and the extent to which the state antagonized its middle classes were significantly lower in Tunisia than in Egypt. Indeed, absolute income differences between the two countries reflect the fact that on the eve of these revolutions the Tunisian middle class was significantly better off than its Egyptian counterpart: the median annual income in Tunisia was 4,690 USD—more than double Egypt's 1,937 USD.

The dynamics of state contraction also bear on the differential age compositions of these revolutions. In Tunisia, the unemployed were overwhelmingly young and spatially concentrated in peripheral areas, including the Center-West region from which Mohamed Bouazizi hailed, and where a third of the population lived below the poverty line.[48] By contrast, the brunt of Egyptian cutbacks was borne by an established middle class, which was almost entirely between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four (84 percent, according to the Arab Barometer survey). As one might expect, in Tunisia 59 percent of those who used the internet at least once a week were younger than twenty-five (chi-square=145.201, significant at the .001 level), whereas in Egypt 70 percent of those who belonged to a civil society association were older than thirty-five (chi-square=14.619, significant at the .001 level). Thus, in addition to the ways in which state contraction exerted differential generational effects in Egypt and Tunisia, the divergent policies of these regimes toward civil society association also had consequences sharply differentiated by generation in terms of the opportunities they provided for coordinating rebellion.

In sum, in the years preceding the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, different incumbent regime strategies aimed at managing state-society relations shaped the character and locus of economic grievances and gave rise to different opposition mobilizing structures. These in turn shaped the different patterns of individual-level participation in the revolutions that eventually broke out in both countries. Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare protections and co-opting rather than overtly repressing opposition created conditions conducive to an urban revolt by the established middle class that was fueled by economic grievances and led by civil society organization, while Ben Ali's constrictive corporatist approach to ruling, combined with neo-liberal economic policies, undermined civil society organization and activated regional and generational grievances, creating the basis for a cross-class alliance that was spearheaded by the young and that began in the provinces, slowly spreading to the capital.

Evaluating Alternative Explanations

The explanations for the Arab uprisings noted earlier each highlight some valid factors underpinning these revolts. None of them, however, can account for the divergent patterns of individual participation in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions identified in the Arab Barometer surveys as coherently as our argument about the effects of disparate regime strategies for dealing with pressures for state contraction and political reform.

For example, a demographic "youth bulge" was certainly present in both Egypt and Tunisia. But as the Arab Barometer surveys show, different age groups predominated among the participants in these two revolutions, and a "youth bulge" explanation cannot explain why a group nearing middle age (35–44 years old) constituted the most over-represented age group among participants in the Egyptian Revolution, whereas in Tunisia those younger than twenty-five participated disproportionately.

Variations in societal usage of social media are similarly unable to account for the differential patterns of revolutionary participation identified in the Arab Barometer survey. Internet usage grew quite rapidly in both Tunisia and Egypt over the 2000s, so that by 2010 internet users constituted 37 percent of Tunisian society and 30 percent of Egyptian society.[49] But according to the Arab Barometer survey, Tunisians were more likely to use the internet at least once a week (29 percent) than were Egyptians (16 percent). This certainly accords with the pattern that we discovered: a considerably greater tendency among Tunisian revolutionaries than their Egyptian counterparts to use the internet as their main source of information during the revolutionary period. In addition, differential use of the internet across these societies on the eve of these revolutions tells us little about why civil society coordination proved to be considerably weaker in the Tunisian Revolution than in the Egyptian Revolution.

The explanation for observed variation in patterns of individual revolutionary participation advanced here works at an intermediate level, focusing on differential state responses to long-run economic and political change and the ways in which these are connected with micro-level resources and cognitive processes. One might object that other values-based factors at the individual level are doing the work that we attribute primarily to the differential effects of the state policies in Tunisia and Egypt. The two most prominent values-based arguments associated with the Arab revolutions are the modernization and secularization hypotheses—the former emphasizing the ways in which the rise of an educated middle class spearheads democratizing political change; the latter focusing on the ways in which Islamic values undermine demand for democratizing change. Numerous accounts of the Arab revolutions reference these theories. However, the evidence for both arguments is weak. First, participants in both revolutions believed overwhelmingly that they were about economic concerns, and only minorities of participants believed that they were primarily about civil and political liberties. Second, revolutionaries in both countries were no more or less religious than the general populations from which they were drawn. We constructed a fifteen-point scale based upon questions in the Arab Barometer survey about five behaviors associated with religiosity. The mean score for Egypt was 9.3 and Tunisia's was 6.1. While revolution participants in Tunisia were significantly less religious than those in Egypt, neither group of revolutionaries was statistically different in this regard from the overall populations of their respective countries. Finally, modernization arguments cannot explain the differences in patterns of revolutionary participation across the two societies that we discovered in the Arab Barometer data. They cannot explain the presence of a cross-class coalition in Tunisia but a more narrowly middle-class coalition in Egypt, nor why participation in the Egyptian Revolution was more likely to be coordinated by civil society

associations than participation in the Tunisian Revolution, even though, by most social and economic indicators, Tunisia was significantly more developed than Egypt.

Likewise, Marxist theories homogenize the differences across the Arab revolutions. Achcar holds that the crony capitalism that followed the breakdown of Arab socialism placed Arab regimes into an antagonistic relationship with their populations, making revolutionary challenge across the region inevitable. While the contraction of the state in the wake of Arab socialism was in fact central to the grievances underpinning these revolts, the ways in which regimes distributed the pain associated with state contraction and managed pressures emanating from society differed considerably, shaping the patterns of revolutionary participation once opportunities emerged. In Achcar's account, the working classes were central players in both Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings.[50] Yet the Arab Barometer surveys show that workers were not central to the Egyptian uprising and were only slightly over-represented in the multi-class coalition that underpinned the Tunisian revolt.

Another economic argument, articulated by Campante and Chor, holds that a combination of weak labor markets and increasing educational credentialing led to frustration that eventually gave way to protest. These authors argue that Egypt and Tunisia take the same values on both of these independent variables (weakening labor markets and increasing educational attainment) and therefore incorrectly predict that the same social forces should be participating in both revolts.[51] As the regressions in Table 3 show, the educated unemployed did participate in the Tunisian Revolution disproportionately to their numbers in the population (and significantly more frequently than the uneducated unemployed). But in Egypt, the unemployed—either educated or uneducated—did not mobilize in substantial numbers relative to their weight within the population. As we have shown, the participation of educated unemployed Tunisians was an important component of the revolutionary challenge to the Tunisian state. They were only a small part of the Tunisian story, however, constituting no more than 16 percent of participants in the Tunisian Revolution (and only 7 percent if we consider just those participants who were unemployed with higher education). A satisfying explanation of the Tunisian case would need to look beyond labor markets to the larger complex of regime strategies used to manage state contraction and at how these played into regional and generational sources of grievance.

Conclusion

As we have seen through the examples of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the recent uprisings in the Arab world were connected with one another broadly through the sense of opportunity they created and their condemnation of arbitrary rule and corruption. However, they hardly fit a single mold. Rather, the constituencies participating in these revolutions varied considerably from country to country, their configurations depending largely on how strategies of incumbent rule in the years leading up to these upheavals provoked particular distributions of societal grievance and activated (or de-activated) opposition mobilizing structures. In Egypt, revolt was spearheaded

predominantly by an established middle class that prioritized economic grievances and channeled its challenge through civil society associations—largely as a result of Mubarak's policies of dismantling welfare benefits for the middle class and allowing the growth of nascent civil society activity. By contrast, Tunisia's revolutionary cross-class alliance was forged by neo-liberal policies that exacerbated regional and generational disparities and by corporatist constrictions that eviscerated civil society. Rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to understanding revolutions, we would do well to pay attention to why revolutionary action resonates with different social sectors across different contexts, why revolutionary challenges assume different forms of coordination, and the ways in which regime policies incentivize and shape the forces that mobilize against them when the opportunities to contest regimes materialize.

Our explanation for who participated in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions has highlighted the critical mediating role played by state policies in determining the effects of large-scale structural change on individual-level participation in revolution. We developed a historical causal narrative that explained differential patterns of revolutionary participation in Egypt and Tunisia by reference to the different ways in which each regime responded to common forces of international and domestic structural change, and how these policies engendered different sets of intensified grievances and fostered or undermined opposition mobilizing structures. Certainly, inequality mattered in both of these revolutions; but it manifested itself quite differently—in middle-class mobilization or in a cross-class alliance—depending on how states managed pressures for contraction and reform. Moreover, none of the extant explanations about the Arab Spring attended to these differences. The Tunisian and Egyptian cases demonstrate that individual decisions to participate in revolution are rooted in deeper structural and historical forces, as Walder suggests, but only through the ways in which states differentially respond to these forces, shaping the critical mechanisms that underpin individual participation in revolutionary action.

NOTES

1. See, for instance, Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, *Democracy's Fourth Wave?: Digital Media and the Arab Spring* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

2. Katerina Dalacoura, "The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications," *International Affairs*, 88 (January 2012), 63–79.

3. See, for instance, Jean-Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising* (London: Hurst & Company, 2011), 33.

4. Filipe R. Campante and Davin Chor, "Why Was the Arab World Poised for Revolution? Schooling, Economic Opportunities, and the Arab Spring," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26 (2012), 167–87.

5. Gilbert Achcar, *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising* (London: Saqi, 2013).

6. Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics*, 44 (January 2012), 127–49; Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, "Why the Modest Harvest?" *Journal of Democracy*, 24 (October 2013), 29–44.

7. Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring," *Foreign Affairs*, 90 (May/June 2011), 2–7.

8. For purposes of this study, we define a revolution as a mass siege of an established government by its own population with the aims of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order.

9. Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 23.

10. See, for instance, Jack A. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4 (2001), 139–87.

11. Andrew G. Walder, "Political Sociology and Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35 (2009), 393–412.

12. The principal investigators of the Arab Barometer surveys are Amaney Jamal, Bassma Kodmani, Khalil Shikaki, and Mark Tessler. The Egyptian survey was administered by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies—led by Gamal Abdel Gawad. The survey in Tunisia was administered by Sigma Group—led by Youssef Meddeb. Both surveys relied on an area probability sampling. See the appendix for a detailed description of Arab Barometer Second Wave data. Due to space constraints, the appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at www.ingentaconnect.com/cuny/cp.

13. See the appendix for details on comparability with other surveys.

14. The question asked: "A number of citizens participated in the protests between January 25 and February 11, 2011 [for Tunisia, December 17, 2010 and January 14, 2011] for various reasons. In your opinion, what were the most important and the second most important reasons for the protests?" Possible replies included the economic situation, civil and political liberties, corruption, replacing the current regime with an Islamic regime, protesting pro-Western state policy, protesting pro-Israel state policy (Egypt only), protesting passing leadership to Gamal Mubarak (Egypt only), or some other reason specified by the respondent that was not among those listed. The question did not ask participants directly why they as individuals participated in the revolution, but given that the respondents we are examining here were revolution participants, one would expect that their answers were likely informed by their own concerns and experiences.

15. A bivariate regression of revolution participation on education was substantively and statistically significant in both countries, and this relationship held when subjected to multivariate controls.

16. The category "professionals" here includes lawyers, accountants, teachers, and doctors. The word used in the Arab Barometer questionnaire for government and private sector "employee" (*muwazzaf*) implies a clerical or administrative position that is distinguished from manual work.

17. A logistic regression of participation in the Egyptian Revolution on a professional dummy shows that the professional category remains statistically significant even when subjected to multivariate controls.

18. See, for example, Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

19. Charitable society members comprised 21 percent of Egyptian Revolution participants, compared with 5 percent of the overall population. By contrast, Tunisian charitable society members were a relatively small portion of the overall population (2 percent) and of revolution participants (5 percent).

20. Emad Eldin Shahin, "Democratic Transformations in Egypt: Controlled Reforms…frustrated Hopes," in Nathan J. Brown and Emad Eldin Shahin, eds., *The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East: Regional Politics and External Policies* (London: Routledge, 2010), 105.

21. Joel Beinin, "A Workers' Social Movement on the Margin of the Global Neoliberal Order, Egypt 2004–2009," in Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, eds., *Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

22. Hazem Kandil, "Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?" *Mediterranean Politics*, 17 (July 2012), 202.

23. These include charitable and professional associations.

24. Brieg Powel and Larbi Sadiki, *Europe and Tunisia: Democratisation via Association* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Mehdi Mabrouk, "A Revolution for Dignity and Freedom: Preliminary Observations on the Social and Cultural Background to the Tunisian Revolution," *The Journal of North African Studies*, 16 (2011), 625–35.

25. Eva Bellin, *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

26. Mabrouk, 631. Several Marxist accounts of the Tunisian Revolution argue that trade unions played a prominent role in coordinating the demonstrations that spiraled through the Tunisian periphery, citing the role of lower level UGTT members in these locales (see, for example Achcar, 153). Yet the way in which trade union members acted—through local networks, in defiance of their national leadership—makes their participation the exception that proves the rule in terms of Egyptian and Tunisian civil society activity. The Egyptian state went to great lengths to suppress independent labor activity during the Nasser and Sadat eras. During the Mubarak era, and through its last decade, in particular, labor activity increased markedly. See Beinin.

27. Powel and Sadiki, 134.
28. Béatrice Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 95.
29. Powel and Sadiki, 189; Eric Gobe, "The Tunisian Bar to the Test of Authoritarianism: Professional and Political Movements in Ben Ali's Tunisia (1990–2007)," *The Journal of North African Studies*, 15 (September 2010), 333–47.
30. Michele Penner Angrist, "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia," *Middle East Journal*, 67 (Autumn 2013), 547–64. For a more critical view of the extent to which the economic gains of the 1990s accrued to middle classes, see Hibou.
31. See Roberta Gatti, Matteo Morgandi, Rebekka Grun, Stefanie Brodmann, and Diego Angel Urdinola, *Jobs for Shared Prosperity: Time for Action in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2013).
32. Béatrice Hibou, Hamza Meddeb, and Mohamed Hamdi, *Tunisia after 14 January and Its Social and Political Economy* (Copenhagen: Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, 2011), 14, 41, available at http://www.euromedrights.org/files/exe_Ra_tunisie_En_150Dpi_847268817.pdf.
33. Mongi Boughazala, *Youth Unemployment and Economic Transition in Tunisia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013), 5–6, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/youth-employment-tunisia-boughzala. Figures calculated from 2006 and 2009 Tunisian labor force surveys, in Boughazala.
34. Emma Murphy, "Under the Emperor's Neoliberal Clothes! Why the International Financial Institutions Got It Wrong in Tunisia," in Nouri Gana, ed., *The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 35–57; World Food Program, "Secondary Data Analysis of the Food Security Situation in Tunisia," April 2011, available at http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp236106.pdf.
35. International Food Policy Research Institute, "Tackling Egypt's Rising Food Insecurity in a Time of Transition," May 2013, available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ifpriwfppn_egypt.pdf.
36. International Crisis Group, "Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way," April 2011, 6, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/tunisia/106-popular-protests-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-iv-tunisias-way.aspx.
37. Hibou et al., 38.
38. Institut National de la Statistique, Republique Tunisienne, *Mesure de La Pauvreté Des Inégalités et de La Polarisation En Tunisie 2000–2010* (October 2012), 17, available at http://www.ins.tn/publication/Mesure_de_la_pauvrete.pdf.
39. See John Waterbury, "Patterns of Urban Growth and Income Distribution in Egypt," in Robert L. Tignor and Goudah Abdel-Kahlek, eds., *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Egypt* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), 342; and Nazih Ayubi, *Bureaucracy & Politics in Contemporary Egypt* (London: Ithaca Press, 1980).
40. Samir Soliman, *The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarak*, Peter Daniel, transl. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 124.
41. A reevaluation of the largest incident of popular contention in Egypt between independence and the 2011 revolution—the 1977 bread riots—underscores the role of this group in the Egyptian social compact. Contrary to popular perceptions that it was the poor who protested subsidy cuts, the scholarly consensus is that the bread riots were "primarily the work of current and prospective civil servants." Ibid., 59.
42. Gatti et al.
43. World Bank, *Middle East and North Africa Economic Developments and Prospects 2005: Oil Booms and Revenue Management* (2005), 55, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/MENA-EDP2005.pdf.
44. Galal Amin, *Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak: 1981–2011* (New York: American University of Cairo Press, 2011).
45. Beinin, 2011, 186.
46. Soliman, 151.
47. Kandil, 210.
48. Hibou et al., 39.
49. Data on internet usage come from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.
50. Achcar, 157.
51. Campante and Chor.

Appendix Description of the Second Wave Arab Barometer Data and Comparison to Similar Surveys

In Tunisia the second wave of the Arab Barometer was fielded from September 30 to October 11, 2011 by Sigma Conseil. The survey was a nationally representative area probability sample of adults ages eighteen and older conducted face-to-face in Arabic. It was conducted in all twenty-four governorates of the country.

The survey employed multistage clustered sampling. The sample was stratified by governorate and further stratified by urban-rural. Interviews were assigned across strata by probability proportional to size (PPS) based on the 2004 census. Within each stratum, delegations were selected using PPS. Within each delegation, sectors were selected using PPS and represent the primary sampling unit (PSU). Within each sector, blocks—roughly equivalent to US census tracts—were selected randomly. Each block contains roughly 50–150 households. Within each household, respondents were selected randomly using a Kish grid informed by quotas for gender and age.

The Tunisian Arab Barometer sample matches population parameters from the 2004 national census closely. Results for age, education, gender, and urbanity are all within 4 percentage points of the census data (see Table A1).

In Egypt the second wave of the Arab Barometer was fielded from June 16 to July 3, 2011 by the al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. The survey is representative of 98 percent of the Egyptian population and includes twenty-two of twenty-seven governorates. The five that are excluded are Matruh, New Valley, North Sinai, Red Sea, and South Sinai, which are outlying governorates that contain roughly 2 percent of the total population. The survey is an area probability sample of adults aged eighteen and older conducted face-to-face in Arabic.

The survey employed multistage clustered sampling. The sample was stratified by governorate and further stratified by urban-rural designation. Interviews were assigned across strata by PPS based on the 2006 census. Within each stratum, sampling blocks, which are designated by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), were selected using PPS and served as the PSU. Within each sampling block, clusters of ten households were randomly selected. Within each household, respondents were selected randomly using a Kish grid informed by a quota for gender.

The Arab Barometer sample from Egypt differs to a small degree from the population parameters available from the 2006 national census. The sample matches closely for gender and urban residence, but is somewhat older and more educated than the population as a whole. The census found that 51 percent of the adult population was between ages eighteen and thirty-four, compared with 43 percent in the Arab Barometer (−8 points). Additionally, the census found that 47 percent of the adult population had a secondary degree or above, compared with 54 percent in the Arab Barometer (+7 points).

Overall, the unweighted samples for both Egypt and Tunisia compare closely with the results from the national census. When weights are applied, particularly in the case of Egypt, the results match census results very closely. We apply weights only in reporting the regression results in Tables 3 and 4.

Our surveys found that 8 percent of the Egyptian sample (n=98) reported participating the protests of the Egyptian Revolution, while 16 percent of those surveyed in Tunisia (n=192) reported participating in the protests of the Tunisian Revolution. These different rates of revolutionary participation may seem puzzling at first glance. As reported in the media at the time, the size of protest demonstrations in Egypt far exceeded those in Tunisia. However, Tunisia is a state of 10.7 million people, whereas Egypt's population is 82.5 million. Scaling participation rates up to total population (an exercise to be interpreted with caution, given sample sizes) would imply that over six million Egyptians participated in the Egyptian Revolution, while fewer than two million Tunisians turned out in the Tunisian Revolution. Thus, although the percentage of individuals protesting in Egypt was smaller, the absolute number of people on the streets was significantly larger in Egypt than in Tunisia.

The responses given in the Arab Barometer surveys are roughly similar to the outcomes reported in other surveys taken in Egypt and Tunisia. A survey carried out by Gallup in April 2011, for instance, found that 11 percent of Egyptians claimed to have participated in the uprising; similar to the findings we report below, it found that civil society membership and education were significant predictors of participation, breeding greater confidence in our results.[1] The International Republican Institute (IRI) also carried out a survey in Egypt at roughly the same time. It finds that 28 percent of the Egyptian population participated in the uprising. This finding is likely driven by the fact that the IRI sample population was far younger and far more educated than the actual Egyptian population or the sample populations in the Arab Barometer and Gallup surveys.[2]

To our knowledge, the only two surveys examining revolutionary participation in Tunisia were carried out by Benstead et al. and Doherty and Schraeder.[3] The study by Benstead et al. indicates that 14 percent of Tunisians reported participating in demonstrations in December 2010 or after. Doherty and Schraeder drew representative samples in

Table A1 Arab Barometer 2 and Census Comparisons

		Egypt		Tunisia	
		AB2 (unweighted)	2006 Census	AB2 (unweighted)	2004 Census
Sex	Male	51	50	50	49
	Female	49	50	50	51
Age	18–34	43	51	43	46
	35+	57	49	57	54
Urbanity	Urban	43	43	66	66
	Rural	57	57	34	34
Education	Less than secondary	46	53	63	60
	Secondary and above	54	47	36	40

six governorates, and their sample distributions closely match those of the Arab Barometer. In the six governorates[4] where they conducted their study, they report a protest participation rate in December 2010 of 18.5 percent. This is almost identical (18.4 percent) to the Arab Barometer's 2010 protest participation rate in these same six governorates.

APPENDIX NOTES

1. See Robert Brym, Robert, Melissa Godbout, Andreas Hoffbauer, Gabe Menard, and Tony Huiquan Zhang, "Social Media in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 65 (June 2014), 266–92.

2. International Republican Institute. Egyptian Public Opinion Survey, June 5, 2011, available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/documents/Egyptian_Public_Opinion_April_14-27_2011.pdf.

3. Lindsay Benstead, Ellen Lust, and Dhafer Malouche, *Tunisian Post-Election Survey: Presentation of Initial Results*, December 11, 2012, available at http://www.pdx.edu/hatfieldschool/sites/www.pdx.edu.hatfieldschool/files/121213_English%20Tunisia%20Post-Election%20Survey%20report%20FINAL_3.pdf; David Doherty and Peter Schraeder, "Patterns of Participation in a Revolution and its Aftermath," *Working Paper*, 2014, available at http://orion.luc.edu/~ddoherty/documents/Tunisia_Participation.pdf.

4. The six governorates were: Sousse, Kairouan, Kasserine, Gafsa, Sidi Bouzid, and Sfax.