

Ortega. The party also manipulated the quota system and electoral rules against women candidates for office. These policies indicated that “the FSLN elite never viewed the elimination of patriarchy as fundamental to its democratic agenda.” Moreover, “democracy itself,” Bayard de Volo concludes, “seems to be an endangered aspect of the FSLN agenda, in no small part because women’s emancipation is not seen as an integral aspect of democracy” (p. 248).

In *After the Revolution*, Ilja A. Luciak sets out to provide a balanced assessment of the revolutionary Left’s record on gender equality in the years after former guerrilla movements were transformed into political parties. This book is based on extensive field research during 1984–89 and 1992–2001 in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, as well as structured interviews with key officials in the three countries and a survey of two hundred Salvadoran ex-combatants. A central thesis is that “meaningful democratization at the national level” requires internal party democracy, a unique challenge for the parties of the Left, which have recently emerged out of “authoritarian, hierarchical, [and] military organizations” (p. xv).

Luciak’s study confirms the persistence of patriarchy in the revolutionary and postrevolutionary politics of Central America, expressed in the epigram: “Of all those who shouldered a rifle, only to the women did they give back a broom” (p. 32). Luciak basically argues that without “a fundamental rethinking of traditional gender relations” there can be no gender equality, and therefore no substantive democratization in the region (p. 225). Ultimately, he warns, quotas, although “an essential part of the struggle to increase women’s representation in the public sphere,” can easily be manipulated to “trap women in mere statistical equality” (p. 225).

Both Luciak and Bayard de Volo consider a controversial dilemma in gender politics for the Latin American political Left: *la doble militancia*, or “double militancy.” Can women activists be loyal to both the women’s movement and the political party at the same time? Or does this dual loyalty compromise the autonomy of the women’s movement and, ultimately, gender equality? Double militancy, a critical concern in all three Central American cases, became especially acute in Nicaragua where, ironically, the women’s movement realized greater advances after the 1990 Sandinista electoral defeat than in the previous decade immediately after the victory of the FSLN. Luciak comes to many of the same conclusions as Bayard de Volo, and he also finds that the FSLN was more self-serving than grounded in its support for women’s rights.

The core of his study, despite a comparative methodology, centers on El Salvador, the peace

process, and the demobilization and integration of the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) into postwar politics. He also examines Nicaragua and Guatemala in order to provide a context and more comprehensive view of the Salvadoran experience. His comparisons reveal that timing and a supportive international climate were critical in the advancement of gender awareness in the region. Thus, women’s issues played a more important role in the peace process in Guatemala in 1996–97 than in El Salvador in 1992. The Guatemalan case was further complicated by the special role of indigenous women, who were some 80% of the URGN (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) guerrilla forces.

Luciak suggests that gender equity has progressed in all three cases as a result of women’s participation in the guerrilla movements, especially in El Salvador and within the FMLN. Salvadoran women learned important lessons from “women’s subordination in the FSLN” and fought for autonomy within the party at the outset (p. 232). And despite relative success in formal gender equality, none of the three countries had passed national quota laws. Indeed, in Nicaragua and El Salvador, recent developments suggest that “the fight for gender equality is suffering a backlash” (p. 230). With the exception of Europe and North America, the revolutionary Left in Central America “looks quite good when compared with the rest of the world” in terms of formal gender equality (p. 231). And Luciak’s extensive quantitative data on rising female representation in political parties and leadership roles clearly bears this out. But formal equality “has yet to translate into substantive change” (p. 230).

His research and that of Bayard de Volo strongly support the conclusion that substantive gender equality can be achieved only by mutual cooperation between men and women, and that the mainstreaming of gender equality remains a prerequisite for substantive democracy in the region.

Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. By Mark R. Beissinger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 520p. \$80.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper.

— Martha Merritt, *University of Notre Dame*

Behind its prosaic title, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State* is a big, original book brimming with conceptual innovation on two much-visited topics: nationalist movements and the Soviet collapse. Mark Beissinger constructs a rigorous empirical edifice that serves to advance his first-rate theoretical reflection rather than to overwhelm it. This carefully

balanced study of nationalist mobilization as a series of waves is a model for those seeking a blend of quantitative and qualitative approaches to worthy subjects.

Beissinger crosses deftly between international relations and comparative politics with his argument that the transnational influence of one wave of nationalism upon another is critical for political success or failure, when joined with the variables of preexisting structural conditions, institutional constraints, and event-specific influences. Drawing on the medium-level data set offered by the 15 Russian republics and a number of subrepublican national minorities, he develops a sophisticated set of indicators to predict the outcome both of nationalist mobilization and of the resulting political struggle. The relatively few mispredictions are treated in full and used to bolster the book’s argument that the iterative effects of nationalism require an approach sensitive to timing and historical experience (pp. 222–33, 243–52).

This study grapples with the role of individual choice driven by a complex set of influences in abnormal political periods (described as “thickened history”). The way things turned out is cast as the product of real people reacting to actual events, not some sort of predetermined pattern of nationalist initiative or regime repression. Repeatedly the reader hears the voices of political actors, as well as the more typically apolitical, as they apprehended incidents at the time of their occurrence, not the events as reconstructed in public imagination or scholarly minds. Sources range from Belorussian schoolchildren chanting “Perestroika” as they go on strike (p. 91) to the rationales provided by political elites for their decisions (e.g., Anatolii Sobchak’s claim that Georgian political leaders expected the exhaustion of protestors to avert violence on the eve of the infamous April 9, 1989 massacre in Tbilisi (pp. 184–85)). One of the most important myths—that the Soviet dissolution was inevitable, and understood as such by most participants in nationalist movements—receives a chapter-length treatment early in the volume. Beissinger’s findings concur with this reviewer’s experiences in the Baltic states during the crucial years leading to independence, a process that took participants by surprise and often ended up hurting political moderates because only nationalist extremists had predicted early victory over the seemingly impervious Soviet regime.

Institutionalists might be particularly interested in the book’s nuanced consideration of constraint. As Beissinger argues, “Institutional constraints are powerful mechanisms for affecting the ways in which individuals think about their identities, for in times of normalized politics people tend to adjust their beliefs to the

boundaries of the permissible” (p. 152). When those boundaries are challenged, the process of changing beliefs about limits is described here as “emboldening”; the transformation of consciousness about which the author writes was indeed experienced by participants as an “awakening” or a “rebirth” (p. 153). Refreshingly, he is less concerned about the tired and artificial debate of primordialism vs. instrumentalism—that is, whether nationalist beliefs that emerge are best understood as preexisting or whether they are created by elite manipulation—than he is about the circumstances that make individuals more willing to risk boundary crossing. A key factor in his analysis is the role of persuasive events that demonstrate the likely rewards of action, for in essence, the regime and the nationalist mobilizers are competing for the support of the less committed, the possible fence-sitters. This process ends, as it did for the Soviet republics, if political incumbents succeed in co-opting the nationalist message.

In an especially significant treatment of repression, Beissinger weighs the options available during the Gorbachev era to impose order. He builds upon a meticulous account of episodes of protest and violence (in graph form on p. 163), during which the leaders of the Soviet Union found themselves falling short on the resources a victorious regime would use to repress nationalist expression. The failure of the Soviet state to defend itself adequately was thus rooted in a widely held conception of how order should be maintained, a case where the boundaries of the permissible did not expand for the leadership (p. 329). In contrast to the current vogue for personalizing regime choices and, in Russia, finding Mikhail Gorbachev weak-willed, Beissinger documents the reluctance of even the more order-bound members of the Politburo to exercise state repression. On the few occasions when they tried to flex regime muscle, the use of force backfired, abetted nationalist mobilization, and precipitated the breakdown of Soviet power.

The book suffers only from a reluctance to engage more fully with the wide range of literature tapped here. In particular, reference to the work of David Laitin, Elie Kedourie, and Steven Solnick (obliquely) begs greater, and sometimes more critical, comparison with the author’s own findings. Laitin’s emphasis on linguistic assimilation receives significant support, though Beissinger’s treatment of the contrast between the Belorussian and Ukrainian cases introduces important additional subtlety. Kedourie’s beautiful prose is quoted to effect, though without a treatment of his insistence that nationalism is a pathology. Beissinger challenges the notion that officials were only or mostly “stealing the state,” to quote Solnick’s excellent phrase, but could

offer a more detailed picture of how his analysis contradicts solely self-interested motives for enlisting nationalism.

Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State should prove useful for graduate and sophisticated undergraduate-level courses on transnational movements, nationalism, and post-Soviet politics. The book’s carefully constructed arguments and weave of evidence make for absorbing reading and will likely stimulate fruitful discussion.

States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain. By Tanja A. Börzel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 284p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

— Christian Tuschhoff, *Emory University*

In the tradition of second-image reversed studies, Tanja Börzel analyzes the impact of European integration on territorial institutions and federalism in Germany and Spain. In both cases, the European Union exerted considerable pressure in order to adjust separation-of-power arrangements by modifying the “say and pay” balances between central and regional governments. However, Germany and Spain responded quite differently. Börzel convincingly shows how actors combine the “logic of consequentiality” with the “logic of appropriateness” when choosing and changing their strategies. Following their cooperative federalism culture, the German regions (*Länder*) consistently responded to Europeanization challenges by cooperating with the central government and continuously adjusting joint decision-making and sharing arrangements. The Spanish Autonomous Communities initially pursued a strategy of confrontation by trying to build a fence around their competencies and shifting costs consistent with the culture of competitive federalism. Only after confrontation failed did they change to a cooperative strategy and adjust domestic institutions. The author finds that Europeanization resulted in facilitating cooperative federalism in both cases. While this reinforced the existing type of cooperative federalism in Germany, competitive federalism in Spain was fundamentally transformed. Europeanization exposed both EU members to the same pressure of adjustment, but the type of federalism determined its adaptability, that is, the degree of change.

Börzel explains these choices of strategy and institutional adaptation and thus makes an important contribution to the growing body of literature on the impact of institutions on choices. She develops her own “Institution Dependency Model” to move beyond explana-

tions offered by liberal intergovernmentalist, neofunctionalist, and multilevel governance theories (Part I). Yet her model selects and combines elements from these theories into a more complex framework. The model predicts, first, that the more European institutions challenge domestic ones (degree of misfit), the greater the chances of domestic institutional change. Second, domestic institutions based on a cooperative institutional culture possess higher adaptability and are less likely to undergo significant change than competitive institutions (p. 39). Formal institutions “delimit the range of strategy options,” whereas “informal institutions [i.e., institutional culture] impact upon their ultimate strategy choice” (p. 214). These are important conditions that help in the understanding of institutional effects. Overall, I agree with Tanja Börzel’s complex picture and comparative analysis of second-image reversed effects, including a convincing causal chain of institutional change (Figure 2, p. 28).

Minor criticism cannot dilute the positive impression of *States and Regions in the European Union*. This is one of the very few studies that creatively combines and integrates rational choice and constructivist explanations (p. 230). The attempt enriches our understanding of how policymakers make choices. However, such increased descriptive complexity has its price. It does not always allow for the identification of the causal mechanism at work. For example, Börzel argues that the initial choice of strategy results from institutional culture, but subsequent strategy changes are determined by rational cost–benefit calculations. Yet it remains unclear why the initial choice is based on the logic of appropriateness and the subsequent choices are determined by cost–benefit calculations. A mechanism such as path dependency or trial and error might have filled the gap.

Consideration of alternative hypothetical outcomes might have further illuminated the reasons for choice. Just imagine how the autonomous communities exiting from the Spanish federation and becoming independent members of the EU could have made their initial strategy of defending their competencies a success. Börzel does not reveal why the exit option was unavailable and/or not a credible threat to support a noncooperative strategy. Nevertheless, the omission leads to an implied overestimation of the range of strategy choices available to the Spanish regions determined by formal institutions. Without such an exit option, the Spanish regions were as trapped in joint decision making as the German *Länder*. In addition, had the Spanish constitutional court sided with the regions instead of the central state, the outcome of institutional adjustment would have been quite different than the