Social Sources of Counterrevolution

State-Sponsored Contention during Revolutionary Episodes

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While supporters of Viktor Yushchenko maintained their grip on the capital, Kiev, at the weekend, in the east of Ukraine the mood against the “orange revolution” hardened. Politicians and officials in the pro-Yanukovich east and south yesterday voted for a referendum on autonomy for a breakaway “South-East Republic” with its capital in Kharkov . . . In Donetsk, the mining capital of the east, some 150,000 Yanukovich backers filled the central square on Saturday. The city’s mayor . . . branded the opposition a “nationalist junta,” and the regional governor . . . attacked the “extremists in Kiev” and demanded that Ukraine become a federal state with autonomy for the east. The mood of the crowd was angry and defensive.

David Crouch, correspondent for The Guardian, reporting from Donetsk on November 29, 2004

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The Orange Revolution from November 21, 2004, through January 10, 2005, is widely considered one of the most spectacular displays of revolutionary protest on the European continent since the end of the Cold War. Over a two-week span, up to a million citizens turned out on Maidan, the main square of Kiev, in temperatures as cold as minus 12 degrees centigrade to demand the annulment of falsified elections and an end to the incumbent regime of Leonid Kuchma and his chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovych. On November 23, Orange candidate Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as president on Maidan in front of a large crowd of onlookers – even before the fraudulent electoral results

1 In all somewhere between 4.9 and 6.7 million people are estimated to have participated in Orange Revolution protests in support of Viktor Yushchenko throughout Ukraine (Beissinger, 2013, 580). For detailed accounts, see Wilson (2005); Way (2005); Åslund and McFaul (2006); Bunce and Wolchik (2011).
declaring pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych as winner were announced. There were several key turning points in the revolution: the defection of pro-Kuchma legislators in voting no-confidence in the Electoral Commission on November 27 (and later their dismissal of Yanukovych as prime minister on December 1); the abandoned effort on November 28 to use force to gain back control over the situation; and the remarkable display of independence on December 3 by members of the Ukrainian Supreme Court to invalidate the election, leading to new elections on December 26 in which Yushchenko won with 52 percent of the vote, resolving the situation of dual power in favor of the opposition.

But as the journalist account at the beginning of this chapter makes clear, the Orange Revolution did not consist only of protests aimed at overturning the Kuchma regime. There were also numerous pro-incumbent demonstrations organized by the Yanukovych campaign. Moreover, as the final vote on December 26 showed, a large portion of the Ukrainian population – 48 percent of the participating electorate – opposed the Orange Revolution, failing to vote for Yushchenko. As political processes, revolutions are much more complex than simplistic narratives about elites versus the masses make them out to be. This significant degree of opposition to the revolution was not reflected in mobilizations in support of Yanukovych, which were intermittent and mostly concentrated in the east and south of the country. The weakness of counterrevolutionary mobilization (despite the starkly divided preferences over revolution within society at large) needs to be considered an essential element of any robust explanation of why the opposition succeeded in the Orange Revolution.

This chapter addresses a serious lacuna in the literature on revolutions: the failure to attend to the role and character of civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization in revolutionary processes. We know considerably more about the networks, identities, and organizational structures that sustain revolutionary mobilization than we do about the political and social sources of those who mobilize against revolution. Why do regimes facing revolutionary threats foster counterrevolutionary mass mobilizations as a tactic for undermining challenges rather than deal directly with challengers through their own bureaucratic or police agencies? When counterrevolution is examined, the tendency in much of the literature has been to treat individual participation as motivated primarily by material concerns (as a result of either cash payments, hierarchical authority, or threats to jobs) and subject to strong selective incentives from bureaucratic agencies and the police. But is this always true, and to what extent does counterrevolutionary mobilization also tap into autonomous sources of support within society? What makes for effective

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2 For exceptions, see Tilly (1964); Mayer (1971, 2000); Sutherland (1986); Gould (1995); Weyland (2016); Slater and Smith (2016).
counterrevolutionary mobilization (i.e. counterrevolutionary mobilization that successfully defends an incumbent regime)?

In this chapter I make four related arguments. First, though its role is often overlooked, counterrevolutionary mobilization has always been an integral part of revolutionary processes going back to the origins of modern revolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Second, like social movement coalitions, there is a segmented character to counterrevolutionary mobilization consisting of both those mobilized through selective incentives and a more autonomous element that mobilizes in support of the status quo. This autonomous element is often motivated less by enthusiasm for the incumbent regime than by fear of the social forces represented by revolutionary movements and the potential consequences should they attain power. Third, these disparate hierarchical and autonomous constituencies are pieced together in an ad hoc manner by agents of the state in the context of revolutionary challenge, often with little integration across them. Counterrevolutionary mobilization tends to be “composite” rather than coalitional in character; whereas elements of a party or social movement coalition negotiate about their representation, their obligations, and the distribution of spoils (Riker, 1962; Laver and Schofield, 1998; Staggenborg, 2010), no such negotiation takes place among counterrevolutionaries, largely because they participate at the calling of the state and its agents and in support of existing authority. Finally, I argue that the ability of regimes to mobilize autonomous social forces and not rely simply on selective incentives is a critical part of what makes for effective counterrevolutionary mobilization. Particularly in an age in which revolutionary success has come to depend heavily on the power of numbers, effective civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization has also increasingly come to rely on generating numbers, and these can only be achieved by tapping into autonomous social and cultural cleavages. I illustrate these arguments through a variety of historical examples and through unusual survey data from the Orange Revolution.

6.2 THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF CIVILIAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY MOBILIZATION

As the editors to this volume detail in their introductory chapter, State-Mobilized Movements serve multiple purposes. In times of hegemonic state dominance, states may sponsor mass mobilization to intimidate opponents (Atwal and Bacon, 2012), reinforce belief in the power of the state (Scott, 1990), aid implementation of policy or hold bureaucrats accountable (Heurlin, 2016), or demonstrate displeasure over the policies of other states (Weiss, 2013). But in unusual times of intensified challenge, the purposes of state-sponsored mobilization narrow considerably, growing increasingly defensive in character. Slater and Smith utilize the term counterrevolution to refer to “collective and reactive efforts to defend the status quo and its varied
range of dominant elites against a credible threat to overturn them from below” (Slater and Smith, 2016, p. 1472). I define a revolution as a mass siege aimed at displacing an incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order. In this respect, counterrevolutionary mobilization is civilian mobilization aimed at countering a credible revolutionary threat. The obvious paradox of counterrevolutionary mobilization is that, while it is ostensibly civilian in composition, it enjoys the support, encouragement, close affiliation with, or direction from the regime that it seeks to defend. This raises the deeper question of why some regimes resort to counterrevolutionary mobilization at all in order to carry out repressive functions normally performed by the police or the military. It also raises questions about how independent counterrevolutionary mobilization ever is from the regime that launches it. In some cases counterrevolutionary mobilizations may be more encouraged than directly orchestrated, and counterrevolutionaries may be motivated less by support for the incumbent regime than by opposition to the social forces represented by revolutionary movements. All this creates ambiguities and tensions within counterrevolutionary mobilizations that merit deeper analysis.

Civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization has been an integral part of modern revolution since its invention. In the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688, for example, Irish Catholics and Scottish Highlander clans put up significant violent resistance to the new Williamite order, providing a social base for counterrevolutionary efforts aimed at restoring King James V to the throne (Pincus, 2009, pp. 267–277). Similarly, in the American Revolution (1775–1783) between 30,000 and 50,000 Loyalists fought on the side of the British, with up to 20 percent of the white population of the colonies openly supporting the Crown and with Loyalists participating in approximately three-quarters of the battles and skirmishes of the revolution (Brown, 1965, p. 249; Allen, 2010, pp. xix–xx). Loyalism in the American Revolution was a distinctly urban and coastal phenomenon. Its most significant social sources were officeholders and appointees of the Crown, wealthy landlords and owners of landed estates, merchants with strong British interests, urban professionals, recent immigrants from England and Scotland, ethnic and religious minorities who feared the implications of a power shift for their personal security, freed or

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3 This definition bears similarity to Goodwin’s (2001, p. 9) definition: “any and all instances in which a state or political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional, and/or violent fashion.”

4 Revolutionary regimes have at times institutionalized mobilization as a means of consolidating control or preventing revolutionary challenges from materializing – so that the divide between mobilization within and outside of periods of heightened contention may be less clear-cut than implied here. Administered mass organizations like the Basij in contemporary Iran – created as a mass movement by a revolutionary regime to defend the revolution against internal enemies and functioning as an arm of the regime for attacking the regime’s opponents – illustrate how the line between revolution and counterrevolution can easily grow blurred. See Golkar (2015). On the Chinese case, see also Perry (2006).
runaway slaves hoping for British support against slavery, and Indian tribes opposed to farmers and settlers. Still, as Brown (among others) has noted, “the British government was generally woefully negligent in rallying and making use of the Loyalists” (Brown, 1965, p. 251), and the weakness of Loyalist mobilization in support of the Crown is considered an important factor leading to British defeat.

In the French Revolution an anti-revolutionary majority in the countryside confronted a pro-revolutionary minority in cities – a gap that widened in particular as the new revolutionary regime moved against the power of the clergy and local aristocracy and imposed mass conscription on the population. The result was a civil war in the countryside, leading to mass repressions by republican armies. As Tilly noted, “Contrary to the old image of a unitary people welcoming the arrival of long-awaited reform, local histories of the revolution make clear that France’s revolutionaries established their power through struggle, and frequently over stubborn popular resistance . . . Counterrevolution occurred not where everyone opposed the revolution, but where irreconcilable differences divided well-defined blocs of supporters and opponents” (Tilly, 1989, p. 86).

French counterrevolution began as insurrectionary plots by aristocrats connected to the Crown who hoped to capitalize on support from foreign powers. It quickly came to encompass a variety of social actors drawn from the old regime’s privileged orders – clergy, rural gentry, country squires, disgruntled army officers. In Sutherland’s words, “[t]he combination of hurt pride, ancient loyalties, fear of disorder, loss of income, and the prospect of unemployment propelled many of these men into careers of conspiracy and exile” (Sutherland, 1986, p. 112). But counterrevolution also tapped into deeper societal cleavages in France. Religion was a major factor that mobilized large numbers against the revolution, splitting the third estate across class and occupational lines and pitting parishioners against supporters of the new regime. As Sutherland notes, one could find merchants, silk and textile workers, artisans, and peasants on both sides of the political divide depending on local economic conditions, the loyalties of local elites, and the contours of religious belief. Nor was counterrevolution confined to a particular region of France (despite the notoriety of the uprising in the Vendée). As Tilly emphasizes, the urban/rural divide was one of the key cleavages separating revolutionary from counterrevolutionary – though again, activity varied according to local circumstances (Tilly, 1964).

Above all, counterrevolution in France was deeply decentralized and reactive, with units operating more or less autonomously and without central

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6 Sutherland, 1986, pp. 107–114. A similar point is made by Tilly (1964, pp. 323–325), who cites figures showing that a large portion of the participants in the Vendée were non-peasants.
coordination. Indeed, Arno Mayer distinguished between what he called the “composite and organized counter-revolution from the top and the spontaneous and irregular anti-revolution from the ground up” that characterized opposition to the French Revolution. As he noted, anti-revolution took the form of peasant revolts that materialized against measures introduced by the newly established urban revolutionary regime – but often remained unconnected with the elite-driven counterrevolution directed by agents of the old regime. Mayer argued that counterrevolution could only be effective if it were coordinated across localities and connected with this more autonomous anti-revolution from below (Mayer, 2000, pp. 7, 57). Throughout much of the nineteenth century this gap between elite-based and mass-based opposition to revolution remained. For instance, as Weyland has documented, in the Revolutions of 1848 the strategies of Prussian and Austrian monarchs for defeating revolutionary threats were oriented primarily toward isolation and repression of revolutionary elites rather than generating mass-based counterrevolutionary mobilization from below. He notes that “in a hierarchical society with a strong, coercion-wielding state, reactionaries’ careful evaluations of the domestic opportunity structure were distinctly top-heavy, focused on middle and elite sectors more than the popular masses” (Weyland, 2016, p. 223).

Over time state agents began to learn new forms of mass mobilization as ways of thwarting revolution. In Paris in 1848, a novel twist on counterrevolution was introduced by the new revolutionary regime in order to prevent a second revolution: the use of organized paramilitaries recruited from the population. The Provisional Government brought to power through the revolutionary overthrow of Louis Phillippe in February 1848 was threatened by a second, more radical, insurrection in June led by the National Workshops and fueled in significant part by the new regime’s tax and social policies. The force used to put down the June Uprising was a Mobile Guard – a paid, 20,000-person civilian militia organized by the Provisional Government. Ironically, it took a revolutionary government to invent the practice of using civilian paramilitaries for the purpose of countering revolutionary threats.

Marx claimed that these paramilitary groups consisted primarily of hired lumpenproletariat (“thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without definite trade, vagabonds”) (Marx, 1978, p. 62). It was Marx who first gave voice to what we might call the “thuggish” theory of counterrevolutionary mobilization: the idea that civilians participating in counterrevolutionary efforts are paid criminals hired by the regime to beat heads. As we will see in the case of Ukraine, for a portion of the civilians participating in counterrevolutionary efforts, this may in fact hold true. However, there has always been a greater complexity to civilian-based counterrevolution. Research by Traugott uncovered that those recruited into the Mobile Guard in 1848 differed little in occupational background from the insurgents that they were charged with suppressing. They were not
predominantly criminals but rather were disproportionately recruited from the same artisanal classes out of which revolutionaries emerged (though Mobile Guard members were younger than their revolutionary counterparts, suggesting greater economic vulnerability) (Traugott, 1980, 1985). Gould (1995) also observed a spatial and network dimension differentiating those who mobilized as revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries in 1848, pointing to the key role played by personal networks in shaping counterrevolutionary recruitment.

By the early twentieth century, autocratic regimes had begun experimenting with still more coordinated models of civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization: the use of mass movements and parties. During the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, for instance, a series of counterrevolutionary mass movements burst onto the political scene, the most infamous of which was the Union of Russian People (URP) and its affiliate organization, the Black Hundred. These movements organized demonstrations, street fights, pogroms, assassinations, and vigilante actions aimed at defending tsarist autocracy, defeating revolutionary threats, and preserving aristocratic privilege and Russian ethnic dominance throughout the empire. While the leadership of the movement was drawn from the upper and middle classes, the rank-and-file were recruited largely from workers, peasants, shopkeepers, priests, and professionals, as well as criminals and the unemployed – exemplifying the composite character of modern counterrevolutionary movements. The police actively abetted the movement, even printing leaflets calling for pogroms in some instances. Langer (2007, pp. 77–79), describing the attractions for joining, states that motives were mixed:

Many undeniably believed in the organization’s stated goals of fighting the revolutionaries and protecting the autocracy … But there was more to URP recruitment than pure political conviction … Some people clearly joined the organization thanks to the prospect of jobs, money-making opportunities, and power associated with membership in a movement that had the tsar’s blessing … Some rank-and-file members viewed the organization as a means to drum up customers for their businesses, even using their speeches during URP meetings as opportunities to hawk their wares … [And some] members of the URP’s various paramilitary groups exploited their positions to earn money through robberies and extortion schemes, particularly aimed at Jews … The prospect of engaging in organized violence represented a final incentive for joining the URP.

At its height, the URP encompassed over 400,000 members. But once the threat of revolution receded, the organization declined – due in part to its leadership’s habit of large-scale skimming from state subsidies. Nevertheless, the URP played an important role in the reconsolidation of tsarist authority over the empire and the rollback of political reforms in the wake of the 1905 Revolution.

There are a number of reasons why regimes countering revolutionist threats might be attracted to using civilian mobilization alongside or in place of their
own police or military forces. For one thing, it can relieve pressure from the police or military. The cohesion of state institutions (and particularly the cohesion of those institutions called upon to carry out repression – the police and the army) is critical for the ability of regimes to survive revolutionary crises (Trotsky, 1932; Skocpol, 1979; Barany, 2016). Defections from the military or police are much more likely when they are in direct contact with opposition forces or repeatedly suffer casualties as a result of being deployed against crowds. For example, declining morale within the military and police as a result of their constant deployment to put down nationalist unrest was a key element in the refusal of many military and KGB officers to defend the Soviet regime at the time of its collapse in 1991 (Beissinger, 2002). Also, for a variety of reasons, the police or military may not be fully reliable or may have network connections with the revolutionary opposition. Revolutionaries have long advocated fraternization with the military and the police as a strategy for undermining the coherence of a regime’s forces of order (Barany, 2016; Ketchley, 2014). For all these reasons, using civilians to carry out repressions can help a regime avoid elite defections from the military or the police.

Moreover, crowds can aid regime control over the streets by engaging in the kind of ruthless acts of violence against opposition protesters that the police or military may be reticent to adopt due to the restrictions of organizational discipline, divisions within a regime, or fear of public backlash. Street fights, pogroms, and acts of vigilantism against the opposition or its supporters are controversial and often difficult for the military or police to carry out, as they turn the military or police into a mob and can sharpen divisions within the regime. Using civilians to repress oppositions may also make it more difficult for the public to attribute blame for repression, lowering the chances of backlash mobilizations. Such calculations are not always correct. In the infamous Battle of the Camel in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011, for instance, hired thugs armed with swords and cudgels riding camels and horses attacked revolutionary protesters. Others threw Molotov cocktails at protesters while police snipers shot from higher locations, killing and injuring hundreds. Broadcast live on Al-Jazeera and other media, the barbaric scenes of thugs attacking protesters with swords backfired, undermining whatever remained of the regime’s domestic and international legitimacy and ultimately sealing its fate (Ketchley, 2014, p. 174).

Civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization can also demonstrate the continuing power of the regime to command popular resources, raising the perceived costs of elite defection. As Graeme Robertson has observed, “[m]aintaining the incumbent advantage . . . depends to a significant extent on maintaining an air of invincibility or permanence, and convincing other potential leaders and elites that their best hopes for advancement lie in continuing to work together with the ruling group rather than organizing against it” (Robertson, 2009, p. 530). If sufficiently large, counterrevolutionary mobilization can demonstrate the limits of public
support for revolution, undermining revolutionary claims to popular legitimacy. In the 2011 Pearl Revolution in Bahrain, after a week of large-scale demonstrations by predominantly Shiite protesters, the monarchy mobilized its own Sunni counterdemonstration of 120,000 on February 21, 2011 (billed by the government as the largest demonstration in Bahraini history) as a way of shoring up support (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 2011, p. 96; Youssef, 2011). Of course, the flip side of this is that, if visibly small relative to revolutionary crowds, counterrevolutionary mobilizations can display a lack of public support for the regime and further undermine its legitimacy and coherence. Particularly in an age of television and social media, numbers matter in the politics of counterrevolution, for they relay signals about where popular sentiments lie.

Violent clashes between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary civilians can also be used to justify emergency rule and the imposition of political order, legitimating harsher and more systematic government repression. In its attempts to halt their drives to independence, for example, Moscow consciously precipitated a crisis in the Baltic republics in 1991 in order to pave the way for imposing martial law. In Lithuania this was done by mobilizing demonstrations by local Russians and Poles, who demanded the resignation of the Lithuanian government over price increases and tried to storm the parliament. In Latvia, after a series of mysterious bombings carried out by the Soviet army to make it appear as if the situation had gotten out of control, pro-Moscow organizations within the Russian-speaking community were directed to organize demonstrations and attempted to seize control over the parliament. Kremlin-controlled media portrayed the region as having slipped into chaos, and in both republics civilian National Salvation Committees were formed demanding that emergency rule be introduced (see Senn, 1995; Jundzis, 2009). In both instances, the strategy failed, largely because of weak commitment to Moscow within local Russian-speaking communities and the appearance of widespread civilian opposition to imposing martial law in Moscow (Beissinger, 2002).

Examples such as these reveal how more than simply selective incentives are at play in civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization. Certainly, civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization has typically relied on diffuse networks of local brokers tied to the regime who utilize their resources, authority, and connections to mobilize individuals in support of the regime. The nature of those brokered networks has changed tremendously over time. In contrast to the late eighteenth century, when local gentry and clerics fulfilled this role, today organizational settings such as government offices and factories have grown increasingly central to the politics of counterrevolution. Whereas village, local parish, and neighborhood networks were once critical to counterrevolutionary mobilizations, today sports clubs, organized criminal groups, and the workplace are more often sites for recruitment – particularly for the enlistment of muscle.
But counterrevolution capable of mobilizing significant numbers requires more than just selective incentives. Rather, a social base is needed to generate the commitment necessary to fuel large-scale counterrevolutionary participation. That social base might form for programmatic reasons (i.e. for belief in the issues championed by the incumbent regime). But it is often based in fear – and often in cultural difference. In pro-regime demonstrations during the Pearl Revolution, for instance, most of the participants were Sunni citizens frightened by the implications of Shia majority rule in a country in which Sunni constituted only 30 percent of the population. Similar use of minorities as a base for pro-regime mobilization occurred during the Soviet collapse. Cultural groups that have relied on a regime for favored treatment or safety are likely candidates to serve as bases of support for counterrevolution due to fear of the harm that successful revolution might do to their interests or the retribution that might accompany a shift in power.

Usually, some mix of incentivized and autonomous elements is pulled together by regime brokers in counterrevolutionary mobilization. While coordinated by businessmen close to the regime and members of Mubarak’s government (including his son Gamal), participants in the Battle of the Camel in Egypt had a variety of motives for participation. Some were recruited by stable owners in the district of El-Haram (where the Great Pyramids are located), believing that the protests were taking a toll on their livelihood of tourism. Others were simply paid to participate. But there were also some who attacked protesters out of their personal belief (formed largely through pro-regime messages broadcast on state-run media) that the protesters represented “enemies of the nation” (Tarek, 2011). In short, most civilian counterrevolutionary mobilizations are composite in character, involving a mix of participation based on material incentives and societal divisions. The nature of the mix varies across cases. But as the cited examples suggest, those who are autonomously mobilized can be motivated more by fear of the power of the social forces represented in the revolutionary opposition than by loyalty to the incumbent regime per se.

6.3 COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: EVIDENCE FROM TWO SURVEYS

While we have a great deal of anecdotal information about civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization, we have generally lacked the kind of systematic data on who participates that would allow us to know much about the types of individuals mobilized and how they compare with others in society. Two highly unusual nationally representative surveys conducted during and after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine help remedy this gap.

The first is a nationally representative survey of 2,044 adults (aged eighteen or older) carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on December 10–14, 2004 – in the immediate wake of the protests but prior to the
The survey asked respondents not only whether they had participated in demonstrations after the second round of voting but also for whom they intended to vote in the upcoming third round of the election, which was to take place on December 26, 2004. Assuming that those who intended to vote for Yanukovych did not demonstrate for Yushchenko (and vice versa), in essence these questions allow one to identify five distinct groups with respect to the revolution (as depicted in Figure 6.1): 1) revolutionaries (those who intended to vote for Yushchenko in the third round of voting and who also participated in protests during the Orange Revolution – 13.6 percent of respondents); 2) revolution supporters (those who intended to vote for Yushchenko in the third round but did not participate in any demonstrations – 26.9 percent of respondents); 3) revolution opponents (those who intended to vote for pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych or against all candidates in the third round but did not participate in protests – 35.7 percent of respondents); 4) counterrevolutionaries (those who participated in protest demonstrations but intended to vote for Yanukovych, against all candidates, or intended not to vote – 4.0 percent of respondents); and 5) the inactive or apathetic (those who did not participate in any protests.

This third round of voting was the clearest expression of whether an individual supported or did not support the Yushchenko candidacy. The first round included numerous other candidates, and the second round occurred prior to the onset of the revolutionary events.
and were undecided about their electoral preference – 18.6 percent of respondents). Of course, given that the survey was taken prior to the third round of the presidential election, it may be a more accurate expression of who participated in the protests than of actual voting behavior (12.2 percent of the sample did not know at the time for whom they would vote or indicated no electoral preference). However, only 2.4 percent of those who said that they participated in protests during the revolution indicated that they did not know for whom they would vote in the upcoming election.

The KIIS survey was a bare-bones survey focused on voting and protest behavior during the revolution; it provides us with some basic demographics on voters and protesters and a few questions about attitudes toward the revolution. Its main advantage is that it occurred in the midst of the revolution and therefore is unlikely to suffer from problems of preference falsification, but it lacks the texture necessary to unpack civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization in much detail. A second survey taken in March 2005, only two months after the conclusion of the revolution, provides a more nuanced picture. The 2005 Monitoring survey was not designed specifically as a study of Orange Revolution participation. Monitoring surveys had been conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences every year since 1994 as a means for analyzing trends within Ukrainian society (Panina, 2005). The survey consisted of two parts: a battery of questions, repeated annually; and one-time questions designed to probe particular issues of the day. In the 2005 Monitoring survey, a series of one-time questions was added on the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election and the Orange Revolution. Respondents were asked to identify the candidate for whom they voted in each of the three rounds of the 2004 presidential election and whether they had participated in any demonstrations during the Orange Revolution and in what manner. Again assuming that those who voted for Yanukovych did not demonstrate for Yushchenko (and vice versa), the questions allow one to identify five distinct groups with respect to the revolution (as depicted in Figure 6.2): 1) revolutionaries (those who reported voting for Yushchenko in the third round of the elections and reported participating in protests during the Orange Revolution – 18.6 percent of respondents); 2) revolution supporters (those who voted for Yushchenko in the third round but did not participate in any demonstrations – 36.3 percent of respondents); 3) revolution opponents (those who voted for pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych or voted against all candidates in the third round but did not participate in protests – 31.5 percent of respondents); 4) counterrevolutionaries

8 A small portion (0.9 percent) of the sample refused to answer the question of whether they or their relatives had participated in any demonstrations, and another 5.4 percent refused to answer the question about their electoral preference. These respondents were dropped from the analysis.

9 The March 2005 Monitoring survey was based on a representative sample of 1,801 adult Ukrainians (eighteen years or older) using a combination of stratified, random, and quota sampling and was conducted March 2–30, 2005, in all provinces of Ukraine. For details on sampling procedures, see Panina (2005), pp. 17–18.
(those who participated in protest demonstrations but voted for Yanukovych, voted against all candidates, or willingly chose not vote – 2.0 percent of respondents); and 5) the inactive or apathetic (those who neither voted nor participated in any protests – 8.6 percent of respondents).10

The main advantage of the Monitoring survey over the KIIS survey is the level of detail about respondents that it provides. In all, the survey asked a total of 357 questions covering a wide variety of topics. In addition to questions about the respondent’s age, gender, marital and family status, level of education, place of residence, religion, nationality, language use, and economic and material situation, the survey asked respondents about their attitudes toward privatization, Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, citizenship and language policy, and political institutions. It asked about respondents’ political self-identification, participation in civil society associations, trust in other people and in institutions, evaluations of political leaders, interactions with the state over the previous twelve months, attitudes toward various nationalities, their biggest fears and what they desired more in their lives, health and drinking habits, height and weight, the size of their living space and how well it was

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10 A small portion (1.4 percent of the sample) refused to indicate whether they had voted in the presidential election or whether they had participated in any demonstrations. These respondents were dropped from the analysis. Another 1.7 percent was disqualified from voting and was also dropped from the analysis (Only two of these respondents indicated that they had participated in the Orange Revolution protests).
heated, how they spent their free time and what consumer goods they owned, thoughts of migration within Ukraine or abroad, access to the Internet and cell-phone ownership, and numerous other questions.

But there are obvious issues with using any retrospective survey of participation in a revolution. Attitudes and beliefs may be affected by the experience of revolution, and bandwagoning and preference falsification are inherent parts of the revolutionary process. The issues are magnified in particular for those on the losing side. The KIIS survey largely avoids these problems, given that it was taken in the middle of the revolution. Not surprisingly, the KIIS sample identified a larger number of counterrevolutionaries (4.0 percent of the sample, or eighty-two individuals) compared with the Monitoring sample (only 2.0 percent of the sample, or thirty-eight individuals). Clearly, one should feel more comfortable about findings based on the KIIS sample than the Monitoring sample, as generalizations based on a sample of only thirty-eight individuals are suspect. Given these trade-offs, my strategy is to compare the results of the two samples, see if they demonstrate similar patterns in those areas in which they overlap, and only then look to the broader range of questions represented in the Monitoring survey.

If one were to project the results of both surveys on Ukraine’s adult population of 36 million, they would indicate that somewhere between 700,000 and 1.4 million people participated in counterrevolutionary protests in support of Yanukovych and the incumbent regime across various parts of Ukraine. That represents a fairly robust level of counterrevolutionary mobilization, even though it was only a fraction of the revolutionary mobilization against which it was oriented. Both surveys show, however, that while more Ukrainians supported the revolution than opposed it, Ukrainian society was much more closely divided over regime-change than the differences in turnout between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries suggested. The official electoral results of the third round of voting indicated that Yushchenko supporters outnumbered Yushchenko opponents on the order of about 6 to 5; the Monitoring survey records a margin of 8 to 5, while the KIIS survey showed a narrow margin of 11 to 10 among likely voters. Nevertheless, protest mobilization among revolution supporters far outnumbered mobilization by revolution opponents (by a factor of almost 9 to 1 in the Monitoring survey and in the KIIS survey by a factor of almost 4 to 1). According to the KIIS survey, 51 percent of Yushchenko voters who did not participate in protests themselves knew someone (a friend, relative, or acquaintance) who participated in a protest during the revolution; by contrast, only 18 percent of Yanukovych voters who did not participate themselves knew someone who participated. Thus, even in successful revolutions like the Orange Revolution (i.e. revolutions in which the opposition is able to attain power), preferences toward the incumbent regime are usually much more deeply divided than visible patterns of collective action suggest. Furthermore, the outcomes of successful revolutions may be due as
much to the relative passivity of potential regime supporters as to the effective mobilization of regime opponents.

6.4 SOCIAL SOURCES OF UKRAINIAN COUNTERREVOLUTION

What do the two samples tell us about the nature of counterrevolutionary mobilization? Table 6.1 shows a number of demographic features of counterrevolutionary participants across the two samples, placing them into comparative perspective relative to the Ukrainian population as a whole, to the Yanukovych supporters from which they were recruited, and to the Orange revolutionaries against whom they mobilized. A number of interesting patterns stand out. For one thing, in terms of gender, both samples show that counterrevolutionaries were more male than the Ukrainian population or Yanukovych voters as a whole, though the differences are more apparent in the Monitoring sample than in the KIIS sample (where gender differences are not statistically significant). In terms of age, both surveys show that counterrevolutionaries tended to be older and more middle-aged than revolutionaries but nevertheless younger than either the Ukrainian population or Yanukovych voters as a whole (the differences are statistically significant in the larger KIIS sample). Surprisingly, according to the KIIS survey, 31 percent of counterrevolutionaries had a higher education – considerably more than Yanukovych voters as a whole (14 percent) and about the same level as those who participated in the pro-Yushchenko protests in Orange Revolution (33 percent). Similar patterns appear in the smaller but less reliable Monitoring survey. Thus, the notion that counterrevolutionaries were uneducated or consisted only of “thugs” is clearly contradicted by the surveys. Rather, both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries consisted disproportionately of those with higher education. Given that education is often associated with the cognitive skills necessary for mobilization (Inglehart, 1990) and that, in most societies, the educated participate disproportionally in protest, the fact that education is associated with participation in both revolution and counterrevolution makes sense, though it defies stereotypes.

At the same time, it is also clear from the surveys that there were multiple dimensions – programmatic, cultural, and clientelistic – to the recruitment of Orange Revolution counterrevolutionaries. For example, in the KIIS survey 42 percent of counterrevolutionaries (as opposed to only 11 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole) fully agreed with the statement that it was necessary to protest in order to defend their vote for president. Indeed, counterrevolutionaries were much more committed to Yanukovych as a candidate than Yanukovych voters more generally. When asked in the KIIS

\[11\] Even controlling for gender, age, and nationality, counterrevolutionaries were more than twice as likely as either Yanukovych supporters or the Ukrainian population as a whole to have had a higher education.
### Table 6.1 The demography of counterrevolution in Ukraine, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample as a whole</td>
<td>Counter revolutionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 35 or younger</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 36–55</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 56 or older</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian nationality</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims Russian as native language</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks only Russian at home</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk province</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Eastern provinces</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern provinces</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
survey for whom they would vote if Yanukovych dropped out of the race, 77 percent of counterrevolutionaries indicated that they would vote against all the other candidates or not vote at all, as opposed to only 58 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole.\textsuperscript{12} In addition to being more educated than Yanukovych voters or the Ukrainian population, for the most part counterrevolutionaries were not one-time activists; 51 percent indicated that they had participated in earlier political meetings or demonstrations during the past twelve months (as opposed to 14 percent of the Ukrainian population and only 2 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole). In fact, counterrevolutionaries were about as politically active in the year leading up to the revolution as were revolutionaries participating in pro-Yushchenko protests – 68 percent of whom had participated in political meetings or demonstrations during the previous year. Counterrevolutionaries also had clearer opinions on a number of public policy issues relative to other groupings. They were more likely to say that they supported socialism over capitalism (47 percent) compared to either Yanukovych supporters (30 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (25 percent), more likely to oppose the privatization of land (71 percent) compared to Yanukovych supporters (55 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (57 percent), and more likely to identify themselves as communists (21 percent) than either Yanukovych supporters (13 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (7 percent).\textsuperscript{13} Again, this hardly fits the image of a politically apathetic mass manipulated by selective incentives and points to at least an element of counterrevolutionary mobilization bearing a programmatic character.

At the same time, the KIIS and the Monitoring surveys provide some highly suggestive evidence of a patronage basis among a significant number of counterrevolutionaries. According to the KIIS survey, 59 percent of counterrevolutionaries came from a single province: Donetsk. Donetsk province is Yanukovych’s home base, where he was born, where he built his political career, and where he received the second-highest level of electoral support (after neighboring Luhansk province).\textsuperscript{14} By contrast, only 21 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole came from Donetsk province.\textsuperscript{15} The Monitoring data provide additional insights into the personalities and lifestyles of counterrevolutionaries that suggest that selective incentives may have played an important role in mobilizing substantial portion of counterrevolutionaries. Thus, controlling for gender and age (and holding their effects constant at their means), there was a .42 probability that

\textsuperscript{12} These differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.
\textsuperscript{13} All these differences are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
\textsuperscript{14} Indeed, 71 percent of counterrevolutionaries came from the Donbas provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk (with another 9 percent from Crimea and 5 percent from Kharkiv). In short, counterrevolutionaries were almost entirely recruited from four out of Ukraine’s twenty-five provinces.
\textsuperscript{15} The difference is statistically significant at the .001 level.
a counterrevolutionary had exercised in the last seven days (as opposed to .22 for other Yanukovych voters, and .17 for all others in Ukrainian society). There was also a .16 probability that counterrevolutionaries had visited a lawyer sometime in the last twelve months (compared to only .05 for other Yanukovych voters and .05 for all others), a .18 probability that they had experienced a crime (robbery, attack, theft, or swindle) in the last twelve months (compared to .08 for other Yanukovych supporters and .08 for all others),16 and a .26 probability that they believed the militia and state security played an important role in the life of Ukrainian society (compared to .13 for other revolution opponents and .12 for all others – even though no counterrevolutionaries reported being a police employee). Moreover, controlling for gender and age, there was a .80 probability that counterrevolutionaries were dissatisfied with the amenities and sanitary conditions of their home (as opposed to .64 for other Yanukovych voters and .39 for all others).17 Surprisingly, controlling for gender and age, there also was a .31 probability that counterrevolutionaries belonged to some civil society association (versus .17 for other revolution opponents and .16 for others).18

As it turned out, most of these groups were sports clubs and professional associations. They also drank alcohol more regularly than other Yanukovych supporters and the rest of the Ukrainian population.19 Counterrevolutionaries were significantly more likely to say that they were in good health, to believe that people are fundamentally dishonest, to lack trust in religious authority, and to believe themselves to be decisive than Yanukovych supporters as a whole or the rest of Ukrainian society. In short, a significant portion of counterrevolutionaries fit the profile one would expect from the thuggish theory of counterrevolution; they were more physically fit (disproportionately belonging to sports clubs), more likely to have had run-ins with the law and legal institutions, and more likely to be dissatisfied with their material situation than either other Yanukovych voters or the rest of the Ukrainian population.

At the same time, there were also significant cultural differences between counterrevolutionaries and the rest of the Ukrainian population. In all, 35 percent of counterrevolutionaries were ethnic Russians (compared to 31 percent of Yanukovych supporters more generally but only 17 percent of the rest of the Ukrainian population and 5 percent of pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants). Only 7 percent of counterrevolutionaries considered

16 Ironically, though they claimed more frequently to be victims of crime, they were also less likely than other revolution opponents or the rest of Ukrainian society to agree that organized crime and criminals played an important role in Ukrainian life.

17 For instance, counterrevolutionaries were less likely to own a refrigerator or a washing machine than Yanukovych voters more generally.

18 All differences were statistically significant at the .001 level.

19 Thus, 63 percent reported drinking several times a month or more frequently, as opposed to only 43 percent of other Yanukovych supporters and 47 percent of the rest of Ukrainian society. These differences were statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
Ukrainian their native language (as opposed to 23 percent of Yanukovych supporters as a whole, 65 percent of the rest of the population, and 83 percent of pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants). Controlling for age and gender, counterrevolutionaries were much less likely to consider Ukraine their motherland (a .68 probability) compared to other Yanukovych voters as a whole (.84) or the rest of the Ukrainian population (.95). And controlling for nationality, counterrevolutionaries were more likely to claim that they had encountered discrimination against Russians over the previous year (a .21 probability) than either other Yanukovych voters as a whole (.09) or the rest of Ukrainian society (.03). In short, given these attitudes, it seems likely that, for some counterrevolutionaries, fears of what a change in power might mean for Russians and Russian-speakers fueled their activism – a pattern evident in many other counterrevolutionary mobilizations over the last two centuries.

### 6.5 THE COMPOSITE CHARACTER OF UKRAINIAN COUNTERREVOLUTION

To examine further the composite nature of counterrevolutionary mobilization in the Orange Revolution, I performed a latent class cluster analysis on the KIIS sample of counterrevolutionaries. Latent class cluster analysis is a finite mixture approach used to identify groupings of individuals who share similar interests, values, characteristics, or behaviors. Individuals are classified into clusters based on the probabilities of their membership, which (unlike traditional k-means cluster analysis) are estimated directly from the model. Moreover, unlike traditional k-means clustering, latent class cluster variables can be continuous, nominal, or ordinal. My expectation was to find that the social sources of counterrevolution in the Orange Revolution clustered into a few key groupings that were also associated with different attitudes and relationships to the incumbent regime.

Although the Monitoring sample provided a richer array of potential clustering variables, the small sample size (n=38) inhibited any credible attempt at clustering. The KIIS sample, by contrast, contained a limited number of variables but a sample size of counterrevolutionaries (n=82) large enough to have some confidence in the results. My strategy was to identify clusters of counterrevolutionaries in the KIIS sample according to the region from which they hailed and self-ascribed cultural characteristics (specifically, ethnicity and language use) and then to test to see whether these clusters corresponded with different attitudinal orientations to the extent that these were measured in the KIIS survey. Luckily, there were several questions in the KIIS survey asking respondents about their attitudes toward current events that

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20 These findings are statistically significant to at least the .05 level or better.
21 See Vermunt and Magidson (2002). Latent Gold 4.5.0 was used to perform the analyses.
allow us to test whether clusters of counterrevolutionaries differed in more than just a demographic sense. Respondents were asked, for example, why they thought people were protesting (respondents could choose up to two reasons from a set list); whether they believed that electoral fraud had taken place in the second round of presidential voting and whether Yanukovych should be considered the legitimate president; and whether they supported preserving public order at any price (this latter question in essence measured a respondent’s willingness to support a violent crackdown against Orange revolution participants). For the question on why people were protesting, two of the responses frequently chosen by Orange revolutionaries received practically no support from counterrevolutionaries: that people were protesting because of electoral fraud; and that people were protesting in support of Viktor Yushchenko. Rather, counterrevolutionaries believed that people were protesting either because they were paid money to do so (35 percent), because they supported Viktor Yanukovych (23 percent), to express their attitudes toward the authorities (12 percent), or to support a just democratic society (12 percent). While we cannot be certain, these answers seemed to imply that respondents were describing their own motivations for participation rather than the motivations of other groupings, though, given the way the question is worded, one cannot be certain. I used the answers to these questions to test whether counterrevolutionaries were divided in their opinions about the revolution and, if so, whether these divisions corresponded with specific demographic clusters.

An initial 5-variable model based on a combination of region, ethnicity, and language performed a reasonable job fitting the data into clusters, producing an R-square value of .93.\(^\text{22}\) I used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to adjudicate between models with different numbers of clusters (Fonseca, 2008; Andrews and Currim, 2003), with the lowest BIC (439.03) suggesting a three-cluster model over the two-cluster or four-cluster alternatives. I have labeled the three clusters: 1) the “Donbas Russian-language-only” contingent (comprising 50 percent of counterrevolutionaries); 2) the “Donbas dual-language” contingent (comprising 30 percent of counterrevolutionaries); and 3) the “Southern” contingent (comprising 20 percent of counterrevolutionaries).\(^\text{23}\) Not

\(^{22}\) The bootstrapped p-value of L-squared (.526) and the dissimilarity index (.84) also suggest a reasonable fit. See Vermunt and Magidson (2002). All of the five variables included in the model were statistically significant at the .05 level, with the exception of the dummy variable for southern regions, which was statistically significant at the .10 level. Out of the eighty-two counterrevolutionaries in the KIIS sample, there were four counterrevolutionaries who came from central Ukraine, and four who came from Kharkov province – groups that were too small to constitute separate clusters but that nevertheless weakened the statistical significance of the southern dummy.

\(^{23}\) Southern provinces in this analysis consist of Crimea, Dnipro, Zaporizhia, Mikolaiv, Odesa, and Kherson. Half of Southern counterrevolutionaries came from Crimea. As the profile plot
unexpectedly, these also happened to be the regions that, a decade later in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution, seceded from Ukraine. The fact that in 2004 counterrevolutionaries also attempted to create a separate republic (though without the support of the Russian state at the time) not only speaks to the deeper cultural divisions underpinning Ukrainian counterrevolution but also suggests the existence of particular scripts of counterrevolution that were repeatedly relied upon in acting out counterrevolution. The Russian-language-only contingent of counterrevolutionaries from the Donbas and the counterrevolutionaries from the south included among them a large number of ethnic Russians, though the southern contingent was the most diverse of the three clusters in terms of language usage. As this breakdown suggests, one of the reasons for the failure of counterrevolution during the Orange Revolution was its limited regional reach: the regime was simply unable to mobilize large numbers outside the Donbas region. In 2014 the regional distribution of counterrevolutionary mobilization was similarly limited, but external Russian state support for separation substituted for this limited regional reach.

As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the two Donbas clusters of counterrevolutionaries demonstrated some sharply different attitudes toward the ongoing events in the Orange Revolution compared to the Southern cluster. When asked why people were protesting in the revolution, Donbas counterrevolutionaries, irrespective of whether they spoke Russian only or had dual-language capability, overwhelmingly replied that they were protesting in order to support Yanukovych, while Southern counterrevolutionaries disproportionately responded that people were protesting in order to defend the values of a just democratic society (though they were also slightly more likely than the Russian-speaking Donbas contingent to indicate that people were protesting because they were paid money). The two Donbas clusters refused to recognize that any electoral fraud had occurred in the second round of the presidential vote and believed that Yanukovych was the legitimate president of Ukraine. By contrast, the Southern counterrevolutionaries by and large did not support this position. The Donbas clusters also were much more supportive of preserving public order at any cost (i.e. supporting a crackdown against revolutionaries) than were the Southern counterrevolutionaries. In short, as one might expect, counterrevolutionaries from the Donbas, where local patronage ties were more evident, were overwhelmingly committed to Yanukovych personally and were willing to accept a violent crackdown against opponents in order to ensure his power, whereas the bases for Southern counterrevolution were more diverse, more policy-driven, and less committed to Yanukovych personally.

indicates, 80 percent of the Southern cluster came from southern Ukrainian provinces; the remainder consisted of the scattered counterrevolutionaries located elsewhere in Ukraine outside the Donbas.
As we have seen, civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization is an integral part of revolutionary processes and has been since the invention of modern revolution in the seventeenth century. It has served a variety of purposes. It can demonstrate the continuing power of an incumbent regime to control institutions and command popular support, raising the costs of defection. It can be used as a tool of repression in place of the police or the military, thereby preserving the morale of the regime’s institutions of order, masking responsibility for repression, providing an avenue for more ruthless violence, and justifying a deeper crackdown through the imposition of a state of emergency. And it can visibly demonstrate the degree of popular support for the incumbent regime within society, undermining revolutionary claims to popular legitimacy.

Counterrevolutionary mobilization has evolved over time much as revolution itself has evolved. It has become much more integrated into the state and into bureaucratic institutions, more urban and less rural, and (as was evident during the Orange Revolution) more educated. But certain features of counterrevolution seem to persist. Counterrevolutionary mobilization has tended to be composite, consisting of a variety of societal segments who are pulled together on an ad hoc basis by state agents (usually,
local brokers) and are mobilized along programmatic, cultural, and patronage lines. It often remains relatively decentralized and not well integrated across localities. Selective incentives usually play some important role, especially in recruiting muscle. But larger and more persistent counterrevolutionary mobilizations require tapping into deeper societal cleavages that can provide a basis for more autonomous mobilization. Clearly, those privileged under an incumbent regime or who share its ideology have particular reason to mobilize in its support. But we have also seen repeatedly that counterrevolutionary mobilizations often tap regional, sectoral, or cultural groups who fear the consequences that a shift of power resulting from revolutionary change might have for their safety and position in society. Such divisions serve as a more reliable base of support for counterrevolution than selective incentives, for they render defection more difficult.

As we have seen, societies experiencing revolutions are much more deeply divided over the fate of the incumbent regime than revolutionary narratives typically admit. Nevertheless, much counterrevolutionary mobilization fails in its purpose of regime defense, in large part because it is limited in scope, reach, and commitment. Such was the case, for instance, in the Orange Revolution, in which counterrevolutionary mobilization was predominantly confined to the Donbas region, relied significantly on patronage relations for mobilization, and had difficulty projecting itself outside of Yanukovych’s home base. Part of the explanation for the success of the Orange Revolution in capturing power was the weakness of the counterrevolutionary forces that it encountered. In this sense, successful revolution involves not merely the effective mobilization of regime opponents but the relative passivity and demobilization of regime supporters as well.

REFERENCES


